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PREFACE
The Corfu Channel incident involved Britain and 
Albania# The event occurred in October, 19l|6 when two 
British destroyers were hit by mines in the North Corfu 
Channel opposite the Albanian shore* This ork, aside 
from a chapter on background, is a recording of the events 
that followed this incident#
The main limitations revolved around the lack of 
understanding the Albanian language. Because of this, 
the bulk of material was drawn from English sources* Lack 
of British and Albanian newspapers limited understanding 
of the feelings of the people. In this respect, the New 
York TImes proved especially valuable* The documents of 
the Security Council proceedings as well as those of the 
Internat! nal Court of Justice were complete* Two letters 
from the British Information Services were especially 




X Position of ships v;hen the Sauraareg, was hit# The 
Mauritug in the lead followed by the Saumarez# After
tiie explosion the Volage came up to i ive assistance and 
was struck at point 6,
Channel that was swept by British Naval forces from 
October 19^^ through February, 19^5 and had been declared 
free of mines#
Information was drawn from several maps presented in 
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ISLAND OF CORFU AND SURROUNDING AREA
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ALBAÎTIA AMD THE CONFLICT OF POWERS
Of all natlona in Europe« Albania in a senae oan be 
aaid to express the greatest abhorrence for central author!*» 
ty* Nowhere la the family solidarity and clan rule more 
strictly adhered to than in the hilly terrain of the Al­
banian homeland*
The nation is still in the making^ the tribal group* 
ings being of more importance than national unity* The 
Albanians are mainly divided into two large groups of 
tribes; the Tosks, in the South, and the Ghegs in the 
North* Both call themselves "Shkupetars”*-^Sons of the 
Eaglo." There still exists elan wars and blood feuds* 
The "Law of Lek"— an eye for an eye and a tooth for a 
tooth— stlll operates as the chief agency of capital 
punishment and is executed according to strict rules. 
This lar of the blood feud Is not a matter of personal 
hatred but actually represents one of the oldest forms 
of Jury trial in the world**
A generation of relative independence, however, had 
clearly shown the Albanians that the main enemy of their 
country was none other than their "adopted cousins* the 
Italians* Since Albanian independence in 1913* the Italians 
had followed a policy of imperialism at the expense of 
Albania* They tried to obtain Albania as a mandate after 
the war and refused to leave Albanian soil until Internal 
resistance and diplomatic pressure forced them to evacuate 
in July of 1920. In I926, the Treaty of Tirana was signed
 ^Fredrick W* L* Eovacs, The Bntamed Balkans, (New
York, 1941)# p. 47.
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reeognlzing reelprooal poXltleal interest* of Albania 
and Italy* A further agreement establishing Italian super­
vision of Albanian coinage was passed in 1930* This was 
followed by a Commercial Treaty in 193# giving Italian 
companies special fishing rights in Albanian waters. The 
climax came in 1939 (April 7) ^ e n  Italian troops invaded 
Albania and Mussolini proclaimed the territory a part of 
the Italian Kingdom*
It was evident that Mussolini looked upon Albania 
as a bridgehead to be enlarged at the expense of the neigh­
boring states* This could be done readily by raising 
demands in the name of Albania* now under Italian control*
When the Italian attack was launched on Greece in October 
28, 19^0# one of the pretenses used was to charge the Greeks 
with terrorist activities against Albania* However* in the 
war that followed, Italian troops unexpectedly were beaten 
back until Hitler came to the rescue in April 19^1*^ The 
division that followed gave to Albania the Kosovo area^ and 
the Western fringe of Macedonia, former territories of 
Yugoslavia and Greece respectively*
In spite of these annexations which might have appealed 
to Albanian national feeling, Italian unpopularity continued
^Yugoslavia fell to the Axis powers only three days 
earlier— April li|, 19̂ 1--all told, the Hasi onslaught had 
reduced both Yugoslavia and Greece to submission in a period 
of only IS days*
3 Elevated plain Southwest of Moravia and North of 
Vardar coast and West of Pristine, which since the First 
ïorld War had been part of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.
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to Inoroaae, Finally» this undercurrent expreased Itself 
in the formation of four main resistance movements. The 
most famous of these were the National Liberation Movement 
(Leflsje Haeional Clirintare) or LHC and the Rational Front 
or Belli Koabetar, The LHC was mainly communist controlled 
and was led by Enver Hoxha# Mustafa Faju, and Mehmet Shuhu,
It had the usual program of armed resistance to invaders 
and political and social democracy after victory* The Belli 
Kombetar in contrast was led by the more conservative faction 
of the Albanian populace, mainly Lef Nose, Anton Horropi, 
and their Commander, Mehdi Frasheri, Besides being less 
liberal, it was also more nationalistic* One of its main 
platforms was retention of the two provinces annexed to 
Albania in the recent war*
AS news of the Albanian resistance trickled through 
to Allied territory, British Military Authorities in the 
middle East began to take an active Interest. Yet, as to 
the manner of appealing to the Albanians, the British were 
placed in a somewhat awkward position* Yugoslavia and Greece, 
both Britain>s Allies, had lost territory to Albania, and 
some of their leaders expressed hope of even annexing added 
Albanian territory* Any promises to the Albanians easily 
could arouse Yugoslav or Greek resentment*
Nevertheless the British command decided to establish 
contact with the Albanian resistance in order to exploit this 
discontent against the Axis powers* During the early part of
*»ll «»
June, two Brltioh offloera, Bl&Jor Maclean and Captain 
Smiley, were parachuted into Northern Greece* From there, 
they made their way Into Albanian territory# The Britleh 
officers soon learned that the two National HeBlstance 
Force* were becoming more preoccupied v ith fighting each 
other than the Pacelet army# The British Mission, Instead 
of attempting to establish some basis for conciliation, 
prudently refused to recognise the differences and attempted 
to join all forces under the banner of a "coî i : cause#*
With the news of the fall of II Duoe,^ recruits 
literally began to pour into the guerilla force*. A large 
part of the country, including such lesser towns as Korchar, 
Elbasen, and Berat were liberated# In September, however, 
the German aragr decided to intervene* The Germans realized 
that they could little afford to leave the Adriatic coast 
open to Allied landing. Hence they ordered their forces 
in Macedonia to occupy the country. Then, as characterized 
German diplomatic affair* In the Balkans, the Third Reich 
aeccKBplished almost a miracle# Unable to spare many troops 
the Germans decided to neutralize the Albanian coast.
Taking advantage of this Internal dissension, the Germans 
appealed to the nationalistic ideas of the Belli Kombetar 
and convinced their leaders that only through German victory 
could Albania hope to hold the two annexed provinces of
"""" ^  (hi July 25, 19^3, Victor Baanuel III dismissed 
Mussolini and appointed Marshal Badoglio to head a new 
government#
Kottovo and ZKaoedonia# k Be gene y Connell of three»
made up of the leaders of the Ball! Kombetar was formed under 
aeman auspices» The UfC with scmte justification thereafter 
began to accuse the Ball! Kombetar of collaboration with 
the enemy.
In May 19Ml-f the LHO forces reorganized themselves 
on a national basis, and changed their title to the Nation* 
al Liberation Army, Two committees were oreated**an Anti* 
Fascist Council of National Liberation and an Albanian 
Council, led by Bnver Hoxha, designed to form a provisional 
government, Subcommittees, called National Liberation 
Committees, were established for the villages, districts, 
and regions liberated. In theory, they were elected by the 
populace but In practice the Sectors and candidates were 
inevitably limited to supporters of ^faithful LNG^
At this time the British Military Mission decided to 
place its support clearly behind the National Liberation 
Army, Remembering that previously the British had supported 
the Ball! Kombetar, the LNG leaders rightly argued that the 
British were only interested in their personal gains in­
stead of the problems of Albania,
By August, 19^^, it became clear that the Germans 
would be forced to evacuate the whole Balkan peninsula. 
Contrary to British desires, but characteristic of Com* 
munist*led resistant movements, the LNC forces began to 
place more emphasis on insuring their control of the
eountry than harassing the enamy* Thus, when the Germans 
âvaouataâ Albania, the LHC with the help of Tito's partisans 
gained control of the whole country* Immediately conferences 
were held between the LITC leaders and agents of Yugoslavia 
and Russia# The general introduction of Soviet Ideas and 
philosophies then began# A domestic program to end the 
feudalism of Albania's clan system^ and socialization of 
all industry quickly followed#
The Western world, although skeptical because of her 
pro-Russian policies, continued to hope that Albania would 
be saved from the Russian orbit# On March 31, 1945»
OTHRA^ operations were begun in Albania# Ro sooner was 
the program started than reports arrived accusing the Eoxha 
regime of using these supplies for political purposes# 
Accompanying this was the refusal of the Albanian Provision­
al Government to allow an Anglo#American Liaison Organiza­
tion to supervise the distribution of relief supplies* In 
view of this* on April 24, Dr# Laurame MaoDaniels, head of
5 It baa been estimated that prior to vdrld War II, 
4/5 of all the land ^as controlled by only 200 individuals#
^ The United Rations Relief and Rehabilitation Ad­
ministration created at the Washington Conference in Novem­
ber, 1943, to "plan, coordinate, administer, or arrange" 
for the administration of measures for relief of victims 
of war in any area under the control of the United Ra­
tions#
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supplie* to Albania» announced that aid was being 
temporarily disbanded,7
The stoppage of relief aid seemed to have had a 
persuasive effect on President Hoxha'* provisional government# 
Almost at once the unacceptable Anglo-American Military 
Organisation was found acceptable. Thus, on August 2, 
an agreement to renew aid :as signed at Tirana between 
Colonel General Hoxha and Colonel D# R,-Oakley-Hill, new 
chief of Albanian Mission* In May, Foreign Service
Officers representing both the United States and Britain 
’«fere allowed passage Into Albania to study the question of 
Allied recognition. Throughout their travels both missions 
were received with greatest cordiality. In autumn of l̂ hS$ 
President Hoxha further expressed his good faith by announcing 
that free and independent elections would be held in December# 
Anglo-American circles were highly impressed by these 
events. Indeed the New York Times, in an article on 
October 17# commenting on future Anglo-American recognition 
of Albania, wrotet "American view of President Hoxha is 
that he is not what he has been accused of being, 'a stooge 
of Moscow** Washington is thought to believe that he Is 
more of a French Socialist than a Russian Communist,
y The official records give a somewhat hypocritical 
reason# They state that aid was disbanded on the grounds 
that Hoxha<a regime was not officially recognised. However 
aid was resumed at a later date even though the Albanian 
government was still not acknowledged#
® Hew York Times, October 17, 191̂ 5#
On November 11, the long exalted Allied recognition 
of Hojcha*« provisional government wae announced* %hlle 
the U3SB announced full recognition, we (Great Britain and 
United Statea} placed two restriction*; first, a stipula­
tion that all treaties enforced prior to April 7> 1939 
should remain valid; and, second, that the future elections 
should be held on a free basis with a secret ballot, and 
without threats or incriminations to any candidate*9
The elections which followed were conducted in true 
communistic fashion. The people %ere allowed to vote for 
any candidate but only the names of the nominees of the 
Democratic Front were placed on the ballot* The results 
were phenomenal* Mlnety-two per cent of the qualified 
electors had voted and of these over ninety-three per cent 
had cast their ballots for the Democratic Front* The con­
stitutional Assembly thus elected held its first meeting on 
January 2, 1946# One of its first acts was to dispose ex- 
King ZoglO and proclaim Albania a sovereign and free 
republic* The constitution adopted was a replica of the 
Bussian Constitution of 1936* The groundwork established.
^ The treaties were of the general type existing 
between friendly nations: ex.. Recognition of US Citizens
and "Most Favorable Ration Treaty," 192$; Arbitration & 
Concilation Treaties of 192$; Naturalisation Treaty of 
January 21, 1931#
Ahmed Bey Zogu who became King Zog in 1927 had 
seized power by overthrowing the Orthodox Bishop Fan Noll 
in 1924# However in the Good Friday, April 6th invasion 
of Albania by Italy (1939)* King Zog and his Queen Geraldine 
had fled*
the nov^netlonal eesembly^^ cumulated its work on January 13# 
by electing Dr. Omeh Niabami as President, and General 
Mehmet Shuhu as minister for Foreign Affairs and national 
Defense. The basis of power, however, was given to Enver 
Hoxha by his appointment as Prime Minister#
The inauguration of the new government at once led 
to increased friction between Albania and her Western Allies* 
The war trials of the collaborators and nationalistic leaders 
was Initiated in February# Immediately the Albanian govern* 
ment began accusing the Western nations (particularly 
Britain) of offering political asylum to many of the so- 
called traitors. Our refusal to expatriate these men 
caused the Hoxha regime to use those trials to accuse the 
%e@tern powers of sinister Intentions towards Albanla*^^
The relations were further strained by the Greek 
Nationalist demands to annex what they called Northern 
Epirus but what Albania recognized as Southern Albania.
The British position on this question had not yet been 
officially stated. However, the past policy of armed aid 
in the establishment of the Greek government led the 
Albanians to assume that the British were supporting the 
Greeks* A further cause of friction arose over the question
. The constitution was not ratified by the people 
until March 12, 19^6,
12 example, in June, 19li-6 one of the 37 accused 
Albanians "confessed" at his trial that the British Major 
Arnold had suggested the assassination of Hoxha* Hugh 
Seton*Wataon, East European Revolution (London, 19^0), p. 226.
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of the Civil War in Greece* Albania^ Bulgaria, and Yugo- 
aXavla were known to be favoring the Greek Guerilla»* 
fhue, when Britain supported the Greeks In the Security 
Council hearings, the Russian bloc, led by Ukranlan Foreign 
Minister Manuilskl accused the British of fostering this 
agitation*
Meanwhile the British Military Mission in Tirana 
was restricted in Its travels by the Hoxha regime. Also, 
the British lar Graves Coomisslon, although it had not 
completed its %ork, was ordered to leave the country*
Then, when Major Victor Smith, Chief Advisor to the 
designated Minister B* C* Rapp, was refused a visa, the 
British government retaliated by recalling Rapp and breaking 
off diplomatic ties with Albania*
Further friction was caused by the proposal of 
Russia and Yugoslavia that Albania be admitted to the Paris 
Peace Conference on the Italian Treaty* The western op­
position was sum larized by Secretary of State Byrnes #10 
stated that this would be contrary to the Morocco Declara­
tion*^^ Finally the Czech compromise that Albania be 
admitted as a silent observer was approved*
Another source of discontent arose over the admittance 
of Albania into the United Rations, Once again Yugoslavia
Mr# Byrnes argued that admission of Albania would 
lead to a new category of "consultative members” which would 
only hamper the work of the conference* He further stated 
that the admission of Albania would establish a precedence 
and that the applications of Egypt, Mexico and Cuba would 
also have to be approved* New York Times, August 10, I9I1.6*
»xx*
and Bussia advooated the aoceptanoe of Albania# Both the 
United Statea and Britain however vetoed this proposal 
largely beeause of the arguments of the Greek Amb&sador# 
Viasill Dendramle, who stated, "Albania does not qualify 
as a peaee~lovlng nation*"^
The elimax of events came In May when two British 
orulsers were fired upon by Albanian coastal batteries# 
London litmedlately demanded an apology which the Albanians 
refused to give# Instead they answered by stating that 
the British ships were not flying British colors and had 
refused to be recognised when so asked by Albanian author­
ities# The British charged unfriendliness and retaliated 
by adapting a definite pro-Greek policy in regard to the 
Civil ^%r# In fact, when a spokesman for the British 
Legation in Greece was asked to comment on the insurrection 
in September, he freely admitted that the Greeks were "still 
receiving arms and equipment from Britain" and further 
indicated his policy by hinting that, if the Greek Guerillas 
became more insistent, "British troops might enter the fight 
as a last resort#"^5
The post-war period had opened with an attempt by 
both Britain and Russia to lure Albania into this respec­
tive orbits# However the tendency of British agents to 
favor the more conservative resistant groups had aroused
% lSewyork Times# August 3, 19lt-6#
York Times# September 26, 19li-6#
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th# auaplelon of the LN(j leader». This accompanied with 
Hoxha*a pro*Sovlet tendeneiea definitely gave the advantage 
to Rue3la* Finally the overall dissension between the 
Soviet 0nion and the western powers asserted Itself in the 
questl(m of recognition# We, the Western Allies, placed 
two res tr let Iona on full acknowledgement whereas the Russians 
game complete approval without any reservations#
Friction was further caused over the question of 
Horthem Epirus# Then, when the '%stem Allies refused 
to allow Albania to take part In the Italian Peace Confer­
ence, this dissension between Russia and the West became a 
naticmal question to the Albanians# When Albania began 
to su port the Creek guerillas and to hasher British 
diplomats, the British government answered by breaking 
off all diplomatic ties with Albania# Thereafter, when 
the two British cruisers were fired upon, events became so 
serious that the question arose only as to when British and 
Albanian relations would explode into another front in the 
East-West conflict# The latter incidents and the events 
which followed can be understood only within the broader 
context of the "Gold War#" The defiant and hostile at­
titude of Albania toward a groat po%er like Britain was 
based on certainty of support from the Soviet TTnlon and 
pro*Communlst governments in the Balkan states#
CHAPTER II
THE pRELmimmr bout
Th« two Britleh cruiaers fired upon by Albanian 
Coatal Batterie* were the Orion and Superb# Thie attack 
oeoured on the 15th of May at approximately 2 p#m. The 
British eruisers had left the port of Trieste and were 
heading South to the port of Corfu by way of the Northern 
entrance of the channel when the incident happened* The 
Corfu channel is very irregular in its width# The middle 
la approximately 17 mile* wide, whereas the northern and 
southern approachers have a width of 1*5 and 6 miles re­
spectively# The eastern part of the channel la part of 
the Albanian coast* However* the western shore Is bor­
dered by the island of Corfu which is part of the Kingdom 
of Greece# The depth of the channel varies from l6o-66c 
feet with the shallowest points being at the two entrances# 
Ocean currents flow into the channel by way of the Southern 
approach from the Ionian Islands and pass out through the 
Northern Strait between the Island of Corfu and Bento 
point of the Albanian shore#
The attack Itself did not prove dangerous# Only 
ten rounds were fired at the cruisers and no hits wore 
scored# Nevertheless the British government looked upon 
this act as entirely unwarranted and contrary to the conduct
- 13*
of a friendly nation. On the 20th of May, the British 
govermaant, acting through its consulate In Belgrade 
Issued a formal protest to the Albanian government* In 
this dispatch, London asked for a clear assurance that 
Albanian coastal batteries would refrain from firing on 
any vessel In peaceful times# Then, after demanding an 
apology from the Albanian government, the note concluded 
by stating that any vessel had the right to cruise in 
open waters on any peaceful mission*^
On May 29th, the Albanian reply %üs received in 
London and promptly declared unsatisfactory. The Albanian 
note was anything but an apology. It accused the British 
of being responsible on the grounds that the cruisers 
were not flying the British flag and had refused to be 
recognized when challenged by Albanian coastal authorities# 
Then and only then, the note continued, did the coastal 
batteries open fire, but with strict orders to fire wide 
of the two ships. A postscript was included contending 
that Albanian sovereignty existed out to a three mile zone 
irrespective of the width of the c h a n n e l . 2
On June 28, General Hoxha sent another dispatch 
to the British government. As a means of explaining the 
incident, the Albanian letter blamed the Greeks for prompt­
ing the attack. General Hoxha charged that the Greeks
^ 2S£IS£2£ nS2£. Say 23, 1 # .  
2 Ibid.. May 30, 19#.
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were often sending ships to shoot at the Albanian shore, 
and defended his country(a actions on the grounds that 
the Albanian coastal authorities thought that the ships 
were Greek, As for presenting any new details, the Al­
banian note merely reiterated the essence of its report 
of May 29th. The note concluded with a statement of 
regret but expressed the hope that the incident would not 
strain Albanlaa-British relations#3
The following day, the British government announced 
that this note was entirely unsatisfactory* Yet, because 
the Balkan situation vas ell ready too delicately balanced, 
London decided to drop the Issue and concentrate on more 
important developments. The Greek Civil %ar was beccmiing 
more precarious. Almost daily reports were Issued from 
Athens accusing the Governments of Albania, Yugoslavia, 
and Bulgaria of supporting the Greek guerillas. The 
situation was further complicated by the Issue of Trieste, 
This area, claimed equally by both Yugoslavia and Italy 
had finally been designated as a free territory. Neither 
state, however, and particularly not Yugoslavia, accepted 
this compromise as final. Consequently, on the very day 
that London announced that the second Albanian reply was 
unsatisfactory the British Foreign Office issued a protest 
to Yugoslavia, In this note Britain accused Yugoslavia 
of hostile act* designed to annex Trieste,^ Therefore,
3 gay York Times, June 29, 19I4.6,
 ̂Ibid,, July 2, 1946.
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the unaatlafectory Albanian reply waa allowed to remain and 
relation* between the two countries continued as auch until 
the Corfu, channel Incident of October 22# I9I+6*
The ships were travelling in typical column fonaa*^ 
tlon* The convoy was made up of the Cruisers Mauritus and 
I,eander and the Destroyers Saumarep and Vol&ge. 0 Mauri*> 
tug was In the lead followed by the Saumares. The Leander 
and Volage were approximately a mile behind* As the 
Saumareg was passing opposite Saranto harbor, the ship 
unexpectedly hit a submerged mine* Immediately the Volage 
came up to offer aid® and It in tarn struck another mine#^ 
Their location was reported as about 3/5 to 1 mile from 
Saranto*^ The other two ships, cruising north of 3aranto, 
opposite Borsl point were not hit. Of the two, the Saumareg 
had received the severest blow. The bow had been blown 
off by the repercussion of the blast. The Volage in turn 
suffered only minor damages, A fire broke out on her deck 
but It was soon brought under control. Both ships were 
able to keep afloat, and the less seriously injured Volage 
took the Saumareg in two and headed for the Port of Corfu, 
The new* of the mining of the destroyers electrified 
the English populace, Xsmediately British newspapers and 
radio stations devoted top space to the Incident, On the
^ Saumareg was hit at 2î53 P#m, and the Volage 
at ^*16* wEencailng to the rescue of the Saumareg, Security 
Council Official Records* 2nd Year, 107th meeting, p,
^ See map for location of ships when hit.
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/
23rd of Ootobor it was announced In the House of Commons 
that at least one officer and thlrty^^aeven enlisted men 
were dead or missing# All told, forty-three enlisted men 
and two officers were reported injured# John Dugdale, 
Financial Secretary of the Admiralty, elaborated this 
report by further stating that this Incident could be any­
thing but an accident# He referred to an Admiralty report 
which stated that periodic mine-sweeping operations had 
been held In the channel from October through February
194^# and had declared the area free of all mines# ?" e 
debate that followed substantiated this argument by stating 
that for two years the channel had been open to shipping 
without incident#?
Meanwhile the Albanian government adopted a "wait 
and see" policy# The Tirana radio acknowledged a report 
of a mishap in the Corfu channel, but no further details 
were given# On the 23rd, however, they boldly broadcast 
an alleged violation of Albanian territory by British 
planes# In this communique the Albanians charged that 
three British war planes had flown over Albanian territory 
in the Muzzno-Hsndot area and especially around the harbor 
of Garante*®
*Hie days that followed brought no official word 
from either government. Yet, In view of the English
^ Kew York Times, October 2lf, 191̂ 6# 
® %bid#, October 2l|., 194&#
premm and radio bulld*up« neutral observers rightly pre*> 
dieted that Britain would not allow the incident to go 
unanswered#
Initiative in the diplomatic field was unexpectedly 
inaugurated by the Albanian government# Cto the 30th of 
October# two official dispatches were sent to the Secretary 
General at the United Nations Headquarters in Lake Success# 
New York# They contained charges of an invasion of Albanian 
waters by British war ships and border violations by •'Greek
Monarchists Fascists#” The notes were sent by Colonel
General Hoxha^ with a request that the United Nations 
General Assembly should Intervene on the grounds that they 
constituted a threat to peaceful relations# The first 
letter charged that on October 22# four British warships 
had entered Albanian territorial waters "without authoriaa-- 
tlon”^® of the government of Albania# The note continued 
by stating that on October 23# British planes flew over 
Albanian territory "with the objective of intimidating and 
p r o v o k i n g # H o x h a * s  second message reiterated charges 
of "Greek Monarchist Fascist** border violations expressing 
the fear that these actions constituted a serious threat to
peace in the Balkans and in the world#
Security Council Offldsl Records. 2nd year "Sup­




The Albanian charge that Brltiah war ships had 
violated her sovereignty was Immediately answered by the 
British government# On the same evening London Issued 
a communique explaining that the principle of a three-mile 
limit of territorial waters did not apply to the case of 
the Corfu channel# This statement contended that, since 
this channel la recognized as an international waterway 
and is only ij miles wide, shipping and war ships may 
travel through it in Innocent passage without violating 
national sovereignty# However the message made no mention 
of the accusation that British planes had flown over 
Albanian territory*^ To this charge the British Foreign 
Office continued to Issue "no comment#" In fact, on Oc* 
tober 31, when Phillip J* Hoel-Baker, British Secretary of 
State for Air, was aaked to comment on this accusation, he 
merely answered by stating that both Albanian claims were 
"unaubgtantiated#*!^ He quickly evaded any further questions 
by going into a long speech criticizing the ingraditude 
of Albania for British support during the war#
A new charge of an Albanian attack on British war 
ships was issued in London on November 2# The British 
Broadcasting Company announced that the 7,270 Ton cruiser, 
gander had been damaged by a direct blow on its superstruc­
ture by Albanian coastal batteries# The statement did not
r -r̂  'yew' York Timea, October 31, 194&#
U  Ibid.. BoT*mb«r 1, 191̂ 6.
mention either the place or date of the attack but only 
that the ship had put In for repairs at Trieste*^ Im­
mediately reports began to circulate that.the incident had 
taken place in the Corfu channel# On November 3^ the whole 
incident was dismissed as a myth by Capt# R, J# Otway- 
Ruthern* commander of the veasel. His statement was 
verified by United Press correspondents in Trieste who 
boarded the ship and reported no damage#^5
Meanwhile# British diplomacy was finally taking 
the initiative# Permission was obtained from the Zone Mine 
Clearance Board of the Mediterranean as well as the Central 
Committee of Mine Clearance in the United States to allow 
the immediate sweeping of the minefield# Since the British 
fleet was the only one available, the Allied Naval Commander- 
in-Chief of the Mediterranean requested them to clear the 
channel# Immediately the British government Informed the 
Albanian Consulate In Belgrade that British mine sweepers 
would begin clearing the area on November 12*̂ 7
On November 11, the Albanian Embassy in Belgrade 
announced that Albania would look upon this act as a "pre­
mediated violation" of Albanian s o v e r e i g n t y . T h e  Tirana
Ibl^, November 2,
^5 %bid.# November 3, 1946#
l6 Security Council Official Records# 2nd year, 107th meeting,^pp. 2^5-296#
^7 New York Times, November 13, 1946*
Ibid#, November 13» 194&*
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government agreed that possibly the Strait might contain 
mines» but proposed that first a Joint commission should 
be established to Inspect the area* Only then, the message 
concluded, would the Albanian government look favorably 
upon any proposal to clear the North Corfu channel*^9
London looked upon this suggestion as only a pretense 
to stall for time. Consequently on November 12, British 
ships, ready for any incident began mine-sweeping operations 
in the Corfu channel* The maneuvers were completed on 
the 13th* The same day. Premier Hoxha issued another 
protest to the United Nations* He charged that British 
behavior was entirely "Illegal."20 He claimed that the 
British had acted without "proper authority"21 &nd that 
the mine-sweeping operations were undertaken without the 
permission of the Albanian government. In a "brutal and
unilateral"22 manner.
Soviet-led states began to support the Albanian 
viewpoint. Indeed, Borba, the official Yugoslavian commu­
nist party organ, charged that the British actions were 
motivated only by a desire to prevent "free development of 
a democratic Albania."23
14 Security Council Official Records. 2nd year, 
'Supplement; #15."^ p.
20 Ibid., p. 50.
21 Ibid., p. 50.
22 Ibid.. p. 50.
23 gew York Times, November 15, 19(̂ 6*
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Meanwhile the Albanian government continued to "play 
up" the alae*«weeplng incident* Tirana radio claimed that 
the British warships had fired on Albanian shore poeltlons#24 
Howevert the British government had not been caught napping# 
Foraeeing this possibility, neutral observers had been 
requested to accompany the operation. Their subsequent 
reports freed the British of any "hostile acts.* All 
emphasized the care taken by the British seamen in dis­
charging the mines# Gunfire was not used from the warships 
to explode the mines* Instead the British sailors had 
used rifle fire from life boats with instructions to fire 
away from the Albanian shore* All told, twenty two mines 
were cleared and of these, two were taken to Malta to be 
examined by the 2one Mine Clearance Board of the Mediter­
ranean* On the 22nd of November the Board, through its 
offices In Rome published a statement of its findings*2$ 
Evidence pointed to the fact that the mines could not have 
lain In the water more than six months* This conclusion 
was based upon three main considerations: One, there was
no appreciable rust nor marine growth on either of the mines ; 
two, grease was still present on the mooring wires 
and three, identification marks and paint wore still clearly
Ibld#\ November 20, 1946$
2$ Ibid», November 20, 1946*
26 Security Council Official Records, 2nd year,
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First official Russian ooiament on the situation wa# 
expressed by Trud# the Labor Union newspaper In Moscow, 
in *n editorial dated November 26* In this ocnmentary,
*Trud charged that the minesweeping operations of the 
British Navy were one more example of reactionary forces 
of the United States and Britain attempting to re-enter 
the Balkans through Imperialism*^®
In the meantime Albanian relations with the United 
States were also reaching a breaking point# Our government 
had issued charges, as early as September, accusing the 
Albanian authorities of violating the treaties In effect 
on April 6, 1939*^ -b continually accused the Hoxha 
government of forcefully holding naturalised American 
citizens of Albanian nationality* These demands were 
climaxed on November 8 when our State Department asked 
permission to send two warships Into the port of Durazzo 
to evacuate the American Military Mission# The Albanian 
government had refused this request on the grounds that it 
was infringing on Albanian territorial waters# However, 
Tirana had expressed its willingness to allow one passenger 
and merchant ship to enter the harbor and evacuate our
I M d »T p# 99* The mines ware found to be of 
German 0#Y#ïype# For picture taken during the operation, as 
well as charts of the area cleared, see "Supplement #6,** 
exhibits 5-7.
26 New York Times* November 27» 194^#
29 Ibid## September 27» 194&*
Our 8tat# Department did not look upon thla 
as an act of a friendly nation# Indeed* some commentators 
speculated that American war ships had been refused passage 
Into Dura%*o harbor for fear they might discover the presence 
of ships responsible for mining the area*31
On November 28, a second Albanian note was sent to 
the Halted nations disputing the right of the British 
warships to clear the Corfu Channel# Tirana claimed that 
the Central Committee of Mine Glearanoe*s consent was not 
official because It lacked the approval of the Albanian 
government*
London immediately answered this charge by stating 
that the mine operations were started only after first 
notifying the Albanian government* Regarding the question 
of permission, the British Foreign Office claimed that 
the authority rested only with the Central ccKomlttee*
Further findings of the decision of the Central Mine Clear­
ance Board were publicized to substantiate the British 
position* The board was composed of four members. A delegate 
of the Soviet Union, United States, Britain and Prance*
All four had expressed their approval of the British request 
to clear the channel* The Russian representative had even
IRT Ibid», November ll|., 19^6*
31 The United States Mission of nine members was 
withdrawn on November lo* They were evacuated by the 
destroyers Noa and Ferry which stood outside the three mile 
limit of Durasse Harter*
pressed for the minesweeping operations on the grounds 
that the safety of shipping neeessltated it "regardless 
of how the Tirana government might feel about its terri- 
torlal waters#"3^
In view of these facts, on December 10, Great 
Britain sent an ultimatum to Albania accusing her govern­
ment of a "deliberately hostile act#" The note also 
demanded an apology within fourteen days and stipulated 
that unless a satisfactory reply was received within this 
time the British government would "have no alternatlv©"33 
but to bring the matter before the Security Council# The 
message was over two-thousand words long and was strongly 
worded throughout# Besides demmandlng this apology. It 
also insisted upon full reparation for the damaged ships 
and oompensation to relatives of all the casualties# The 
message concluded with a further statement that an apology 
be made for the "unprovocatlv© attack upon the Royal Navy"34 
for the incident of May 1$#
On the l6th, the Albanian government Immediately 
sent a note acknowledging receipt of the British ultimatum# 
The British demands, however, were tactfully omlted froa 
the letter# In view of this, the British government
36 New York Times# January I8, 1947*
33 Security Council Official Records# 2nd year,
" Supp lament #3 • ** P# 4i*
34 Ibid## p. 4^* The udiole ultimatum covers pages
35^4 1»
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Immedlately «nnouneftâ that it did not oonaider this note 
as a reply*35 A second Albanian reply to the December 10 
note was handed to Charles Peak, British Ambassador to 
Belgrade on December 20. In this letter, Tirana expressed 
its profound regrets for the accident but rejected all 
accusations contained in the note as contrary to the 
"peaceful aspirations and purposes so often expressed by 
the Albanian government."36 The text was further enlarged 
to explain Albanian innocence by hinting that the mines 
could have drifted from the Trieste-Pola area which was 
known to be still mlne«infested.37 Another point was men­
tioned to substantiate British claims. The note mentioned 
that ships had passed through Corfu*s waters for two years 
without being hit by mines. In conclusion, the message 
stated that the British were entirely to blame for the 
unpeaceful relations existing between the two nations.
This point was supported by various arguments* British 
opposition to the entry of Albania into the United Nations; 
failure to establish direct diplomatic contact; November 12 
minesweeplng operations; October 23, flying of British 
planes over Albanian territory.30
35 Hew 7ork Times, December 17, 191̂ -6.
36 Security Council official Records, 2nd year, 
"Supplement #5*^ P p "
37 Main ocean currents of this area seems to dispute 
this possibility*
38 Ibid** pp* 1|.1«45*
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The Britlah Foreign Office immediately declared 
that thla new Albanian note waa unsatisfactory,39 However, 
London did not lasue any auoeeaaive appeal. The situation 
remained as auch until January 1# 19^7, when Premier Hoxha, 
in a Hew Years Broadcast, over a Tirana radio charged 
Britain with three violation* of Albanian sovereignty.
The first two were mainly a reiteration of the communique 
of October 30 that had been sent to Trygve Lie, The third 
in turn was merely a restatement that the British Mine 
operation action of November 12 and 13 had been illegal. 
Commenting on the British threat of submitting the Corfu 
incident to the Security Council, General Hoxha claimed 
that Albania had nothing to hide and would welcome any 
Gnited Nations Inquiry, The message concluded with a hope 
for a good year and closed with the statement, **?e wish the 
people of Europe, and the British people in particular to 
know how their officials are acting towards Albania,
On the I|th of January, the Greek government announced 
to London that the Corfu channel waa mined again,4l Though 
the report was not taken seriously. It certainly illustrated 
how all sides were trying to confuse the issue. It was 
rumored on July 8, that Britain intended to present the 
ease before the Security Council, On the latter day,
^9 Miew^York Times, December 28, 191̂ -6,
Ibid.. January 2,
Itetfl*. January I4., 19^7.
London «nnouneod that P* If, Synott and Commander %. R. D* 
Swoder were being sent to Lake Sueces» to act as special 
advisors to the United Kingdom officials.^2 Confirmation 
came on January 9# when the British government formally 
placed a complaint before the United Rations asking the 
Council to act on the case. Concurrently, Peak presented 
another note to the Albanian charge d •affair that the 
Tirana reply of December 21, was entirely unsatisfactory. 
TherefCM, in view of the failure of the Albanian government 
to present a counter^proposal, "His Majesty's government 
is taking steps to bring the matter before the Security
Council."^3
On the 12th of January, the text of the Albanian 
reply of December 21# and the findings of the Mines Clear-* 
ance Commission were formally presented to the United 
R a t i o n s J a n u a r y  20, the British proposal was finally 
placed before the Security Council. Immediately the USSR 
delegate, Gromyko, raised objections to the placing of the 
British complaint before the Security Council. After 
elaborating a long speech of "therefores and wherefores" 
of why it should not be presented, he concluded his arguments
Ibid., January 8, 1947*
43 Secwlty Council Official Records, 2nd year,
"Supp lament Pp* 45*46,
44 Sew York Times, January 13, 1947* In reporting 
this incident îEey alsostated that a British Admiralty 
Source had said that on October 24, a UHRRA ship had been 
fired upon by Albanian Coastal authorities opposite Saranto 
harbor*
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by stating that Great Britain had not ezhausted every mean* 
of reaching a aettle^^nt with Albania* The main gist of 
this argument was based upon the assumption that Great 
Britain# by rejecting the Albanian proposal to establish 
a joint commission to Investigate clearing of the channel# 
waa acting contrary to Article XXXIII of the United Hâtions 
Charter*^5 This article states that all parties to a 
dispute should first attempt to settle their differences 
by means of negotiations before applying to the United 
Hâtions* Sir Alexander Gadogan, British delegate to the 
Security Council answered Gromyko's charge by stating 
that the Albanian proposal for a joint commission was not 
one to settle all their differences but to deal only with 
the clearing of the channel# which he argued# had already 
been approved by the Mine Clearance Board* Sir Alexander 
further replied by referring to Article XXXVI of the 
Charter which says in effect that the Security Council 
may act at any stage of a dispute and recommend appropri­
ate procedures for adjustments *4^
The Council then voted on the British proposal.
It passed by a 10-0 vote with the Russian delegate# Gromyko 
abstaining* It was further decided without a recorded 
vote that before considering the substance of the Albanian
The United Kingdom presented the case to the 
Security Council under the provisions of Article 35»
See appendix*
myO’*
question» IXbsnls would be Invited to participate without 
a vote#^7 The Council then voted» 10#0» with Ororayko 
again abstaining, on the proposal of the President H, J* 0# 
Makln, of Australia, that the date for the beginning of 
discussions should be determined by the president* This 
was to enable the Albanian delegate to attend*^^ The 
official Albanian position in the Security Council deel* 
sion was made known by cable on January 2!̂ , by Colonel 
General Enver Hoxha* have the honor to inform you,”
Hoxha stated, ”that the Albanian government accepts the 
Security Council*s decision* llr* Hysnl Kapo will be our 
representative, but because of very difficult communications. 
It would be impossible to place his date of arrival In 
Hew York, and we ask postponement of any discussions 
until then*”49
The unprovoked attack of May 15th on the two British 
cruisers had been allowed by the British Foreign Office 
to subside without any formal apology* In contrast, British 
reaction to the mining of the two destroyers was anything 
but passive* This change of policy can be attributed to 
several reasonss British naval tradition, principle of 
the freedcm of the seas, and above all the demands for
 ̂ Rights of a Hon-member State in a dispute*-see 
Appendix, Article 32#
48 Security Council Official Records, 2nd year,
9 5th meetl^# !̂ p# 123^123*
49 Ibid*, 2nd year, "Supplement #3*” ?• 131*
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retribution for the lives lost# British policy was cer­
tainly fair# Suspicions were raised in the House of 
Commons as early as the 23rd of October, yet no formal 
protest was sent until after these accusations had been 
substantiated by findings of the Zone Mine Com%ittee 
report# Gromyko did present a good argument when he 
claimed the British govermieat had not exhausted all means 
of arbitration before sending the case to the United 
Bâtions# However, in view of Albanian attitude toward 
the ?,1ay 15th incident, British policy was understandable# 
Both in the May 15tb as well as the October 22 incident 
the Albanian government was certainly anything but concilia­
tory# Instead of attempting arbitration, the Albanian 
policy was primarily one of accusation and counter-chargee# 
In advocating the establishment of a Joint committee to 
investigate the clearing of the channel, the Albanian 
government did present a worthwhile proposal# Indeed if 
both nations would have desired conciliation this committee 
might have led to a fruitful agreement# Yet in advocating 
this commission on the very eve that the channel was to be 
cleared certainly does not express a policy of atonement# 
This accompanied with the fact that the proposed commission 
was to be limited to only the question of clearing the 
channel cannot be taken as a pretense to arbitrate# After 
all, the basic question was one of bodily and property 
damage and not a question of clearing the channel#
The oupport expreaaea by both Hussia and her Satel- 
Iltaa through their nevspaper editorial* olearly indicate* 
unwavering aupport of the Albanian viewpoint* Thla, 
aeowapanled by the Russian opposition to the British pro-* 
pneal of presenting the case to the United Haticoi*, can 
tmXy lead to the assumption that the Security Council 
proceeding* would be anything but melodious*
CHAPTBR III 
SEC0BITT COÜÎÎCIL immmoM
In #plt* of Albanian acceptance, the question of 
the Corfu incident waa not taken up Immediately In the 
Uhlted Katlons Security Council* Worman J* o# Makln, 
President of the Security Council, had tenatively set the 
28th of January for the beginning of the dissuasions* 
However, when the council assembled on the proposed date, 
the Albanian representative had not yet arrived* Sir 
Alexander, United Kingdom delegate, thereupon proposed 
sending another cable to the Albanian government asking 
for the approximate date when Hysnl Kapo would arrive* 
Immediately the Russian delegate opposed this overture*
He based his objection on the ground that the Albanian 
representative could hardly have completed his preparation* 
Sir Alexander answered this criticism by pointing out to 
the Russian delegate that his government had indicated to 
the Albanian government its intent to bring the case before 
the United Rations as early as the ?th of December. Then, 
he continued, Britain officially had informed the govern^ 
ment of Albania on the 9th of January that the case would 
be placed before the Security Council* Therefore, he 
argued, Tirana had had plenty of time to make preparations* 
In spite of these arguments, Gromyko raised the question,
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tthoulâ we Indulge in the unnecessary exchange of 
telegrame*"^ Oscar Lange, the Polish delegate, ended this 
debate by a recommendation to leave this problem up to the 
President’s discretion. The Lange proposal "ĵas then 
approved, and the first meeting of the Security Council 
on the Corfu incident ended#
Similar meetings were tentatively set by the Presi­
dent during the remaining days of January as well as by 
the succeeding President, 1?, Van Langehove of Belgium, 
for the first two weeks in February# Still no official 
word vïaa received on the proposed date of the Albanian 
delegate*e arrival# Reports circulating throughout lîurope 
placed Kapo*a vdiere&bouts In Belgrade, Paris, and then 
back in Belgrade# T?lnally, Kapo clarified these rumors 
by sending a cable on the 11th of February from Paris 
stating that he would arrive in Hew York on the 12th#
Yet the 12th came and went, and still Kapo had not arrived* 
On the 13th, however, the Albanian delegate finally arrived 
at LaOuardia Field but on a plane from Geneva and not Paris* 
^hen asked by reporters what was keeping him, he cheer­
fully answered, "Bad Transportation,*2
In spite of this delay, the Security Council welcomed 
Kapo with evident relief, and discussions were offically
 ^ Seeurity Council Official Record. 2nd year,
96th meeting, 'p# li4#
^ York Times# February 13, 1947*
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opened on the 18th of February♦ Immediately Sir Alexander 
began presenting the British side of the ease. The speech 
which followed was wrathful but quite elegant in its 
dialogue* It was truly an exhaustive presentation sprinkled 
with nautical details* Sir Alexander began by emphasising 
that the case in no way should be considered from the 
point of view of the mining of only warships* For, he 
stated, the mines could have equally destroyed merchant 
ships of any nationality* After these opening remarks 
he followed with a full synoposls of all events that had 
happened since the Incident on October 22 as well as a 
lengthy discussion on the May I3'th Issue. Submitting that 
the Council must find that the mines had been recently 
laid in violation of international law. Sir Alexander said 
that the next question was, **̂ ho laid them?*3 Although 
he admitted he could not produce eyewitnesses to the 
minelaying, he pointed to an inescapable Albanian re­
sponsibility* He then invited the Council to consider 
the wider implications of this case* For, he said, it 
must be clear to all that international peace and security 
cannot be maintained "when criminal incidents such as 
this are allowed to continue*"^ On the basis of thla 
evidence he then submitted to the council four main





1* That an linnotlfled minefield was laid in the 
Corfu straits by the Albanian government or 
with Its oonnlvanoe, resulting in serious 
Injury to British ships and loss of life and 
injury to their crews,
2* That the United Kingdom and Albanian Governments 
should settle the dispute between them on the 
basis of the Council*s findings and that in 
the event of a failure to settle^ either party 
may apply to the Council for further considera­
tion of the matter,
3« That the Council will retain the dispute on its 
agenda until both parties certify that it has 
been settled to their satisfaction.
That, since the laying of mines in peacetime 
without notification 1» unjustified and an 
offence against humanity and since it is the 
duty of governments to remove promptly mines 
laid in time of war, the Council should remind 
all states, whether members of the United 
Nations or not, that It is incumbent on them 
to sweep or permit to be swept all parts of their 
territorial waters where there_ls reason to 
suspect the presence of mines
The Albanian reply /̂as presented by î̂ îysni Kapo^ 
on the 19th of February, In contrast to Sir Alexander, Kapo 
gave a speech definitely lacking in eloquence. Before 
beginning his oration, Kapo asked sarcastically why the 
British request, \^lch >̂is submitted on January 16, 19q7, 
had been imnedlately placed on the agenda of the United 
Nations security Council whereas the Albanian request of
^ Ibid», 2nd year, 107th meeting, p, 306,
^ Hysnl Kapo was assisted by Nesti Zapo, although 
all disouasiona throughout the Security Council proceed­
ings were presented by Mr, Kapo,
« 37*
Ootober 29* had still not been taken Into consideration*
0ontliming in this tone, Kapo reviewed the events of 
May 15 and October 22# His Interpretation of events was 
entirely different frcmi that of Sir Alexander* On the 
question of minefields he violently argued that Albania 
was innocent. He declared Albania ”• * * had no reason 
for laying mines or allowing them to be lald#*^ He then 
hinted that the mines could easily have drifted from the 
Trieste-Pola area*^
The basis of Kapo's main argument revolved around 
two main questiona«-territorlal waters and Innocent passage* 
Kapo completely repudiated Sir Alexander** statement that 
the Corfu Channel could be classified only as an inter# 
natimml waterway* Although peaceful ships could pass 
through the channel, he stated that the nearness of the 
Albanian shore clearly classified the strait as a national 
channel* Kapo then asked if one could consider as innocent 
passage the parading of warships in territorial waters*
Such passing* he contended* could not be regarded as in­
nocent passage* He then reiterated the Albanian charge 
of November 13 that British action in clearing the channel 
was entirely illegal* He contended that* since the channel 
was part of the Albanian waters* the government of Albania
Security Council Official Records* 2nd year*
107th meeting* p* 300.
a This argument was first mentioned in the Albanian 
note of December 9# 1946# See Chapter 2* page 26.
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should have b**a consulted first before any such action 
vas taken# Continuing In this mood# Kapo accused the 
United Kingdom of misconstruing the facts to suit its 
ovn interests#9
In summing up his case, the Albanian delegate listed 
two main argumentsî One, the British government did not 
advance any convincing evidence to prove the accusations 
that the Albanian government either laid the mines or had 
any knowledge of them; two, the British mine-sweeping 
operations on November 12 and I3, as well as the events 
of May 15 and October 22, proved th t the whole responsi­
bility could be blamed on the British government.^®
The debate that followed produced no enlightening 
facts# Mostly it was a reiteration by both delegates to 
emphasise their strong points. However, Gromyko did 
heighten the session by adding several remarks# He charged 
that the British actions were ”provocatlve**^^ and in 
violation of Albanian sovereignty. He elaborated this 
point by hinting that British actions throughout the whole 
incident v/ere prompted by a desire to support the anti- 
Albanian policy of Greece* Sir Alexander immediately 
answered that these charges were false and accused the
9 February 21, the Albanian government promoted 
Minister Kapo to the rank of Assistant Minister of Foreign 
Affairs# Hew Tork Times# February 22, 19^7#
Security Council Official Records* 2nd year, 
109th meeting, pp# Jiëy-SÏT*
itia*. pp. A 9.
-39*
Ru8*l&m delegate of mlaconstruing the facts» A motion 
vas then made to adjourn the meeting* and the session 
closed until February 20»^^ Thus the discussions that 
should have followed with an attempt to evaluate the ease 
ended only with accusations and counteraccusations»
The February 20 meeting was cancelled because of 
snow» Yet even this action caused disagreement among the 
delegates» Kapo* ^hen asked to comment on the cancellation* 
Charged that he had not been for warned and had come from 
New York on the Long Island Railroad and could see no 
reason why the meeting was not held.13
The next meeting was not called until the 21;. of 
February#l4 In a sense this hearing was a rehash of the 
earlier sessions. Sir Alexander would bring up some point 
for discussion. Im/aediately Kapo would give an answer and 
take the opportunity of bringing a charge against the 
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom would feel bround to 
contradict the insinuation and would invariably draw 
attention to some other aspect of the case. Then Gromyko 
In turn would feel bound to intervene and tell Sir Alex* 
ander that what he said was untrue* absured* and above all*
Ibid,, pp. *7-3^9.
^3 Mew York Times# February 22* 19^7#
During the hearings of the Corfu Channel in* 
cldent the Security Council was also scheduling discussions 
on Atomic Energy* Former Japanese Mandated Islands {Marshall 
Islands* Marianas and CarolInas of the Palau group* etc.) 
and Greek Civil l̂ ar»
«•Ij.O'*
that Sir Alexander "was out of order#
In an attempt to end this stalemate, the Australian 
delegate, Haaluok, ultimately recommended that a sub- 
committee be formed to Investigate the case. He contended 
that a smaller body would be able to reach a conclusion 
more easily than the whole Security Council# The terms 
of this proposal vave the committee CŒnplete freedom of 
action# The only instructions were that they should meet 
in Hew York City and should report their findings to the 
Security Council by March 3.1^ He further suggested that 
the subc(%nmittee should be enpowered to request all in­
formât 1<% fr<ma both the United Kingdom and Albania# This 
proposal was seconded by the American delegate, Herschol 
V. Johnson# The Russ.- in anr 11 ̂h delegates, however, 
immediately opposed the motion. U* Michalowski, the 
Polish representative, charged that the ccamaittee would 
accomplish nothing. Orooiyko continued this argument by 
stating that the British case was "absolutely unjustified" 
and therefore there was no need for any subcommittee.^7 
During the successive days, "behind-the-scenes" 
political maneuvering must have taken place. On the 27th, 
the Russian and Polish delegates completely reversed their
Security Council Official Records# 2nd year, 
111th meeting, pp.
This date was later changed to March 10 by an 
amendment of Chinese delegate, Mr. Quo Tai-ohi.
^7 Security Council Official Records. 2nd year,
111th meetÏKS# P* 3S6*'''
opposition by remaining silent when the pecoaraendatlon was 
placed to a vote# Thue$ the Australian resolution was 
adopted BmO with Poland# Syria and Bussla abstaining#^® 
Following this# ll»Khourl# the Syrian delegate nominated 
the states of Colombia# Poland# and Australia as members 
of the cwmlttee# Immediately Gromyko# the soviet delegate 
supported the Syrian motion# Johnson# the American delegate# 
must not have known of these political maneuvers# for# 
when the Polish name waa nomln bed# he objected on the 
grounds that the Polish delegate ". # # has expressed 
the opinion that the subcommittee couldn't possibly perform 
any useful function# rhen the vote was taken, however# 
the United States supported the proposal# and the recom* 
mendation was unanimously passed#
The Chairman of the committee was Eduardo Zuleta 
Angel of Colombia# The other two members were Paul Has luck 
and Julius Kats^Suohy of Australia and Poland respectively# 
The meetings began in closed session on the 2nd of %arch 
In the Empire State Building# The auboommittee proceeded on 
the principle that It was neither a committee of investiga­
tion nor a fact-finding board but rather a commission to
The member8 of the Security Council at this time 
were: Australia# Belgium, Brazil# China# Colombia# France#
Poland, Syria# USSR, United Klngdcm# United States# Britain 
did not vote because It stipulates in Article 27, para­
graph 3# on Voting Procedure that a party In a Regional 
dispute shall not vote# See Appendix#
^9 Security Council Official Records# 2nd year# 
lll|.th meeting#
consolidât» the facta« All told, the committee held ten 
meetings# Five of these sessions were occupied with question* 
Ing the representatives of the United Kingdom and Albania#
The peraanent representative of Greece to the United 
Nations# Vaaslll Dendrames# was also oalled In for question* 
Ing# The Greek delegate was drawn Into the dispute because 
Kapo# in the course of his testimony# had hinted that the 
mines might have been laid by Greece to strain Albanian* 
British relations# Kapo had raised the question# "#ho 
could gain by this incident, except areece?*20 The Albanian 
delegate previously had not mentioned tils -oint In pre* 
senting his case before the Security Council# Yet In an 
atî:empt to evaluate all the facts, Yasslli Dendramas was 
called upon to testify before the subcommittee# He denied 
the charge most emphatloally+^l
The rest of the meetings were devoted primarily to 
writing up a report to submit to the Security Council#
In this task# the subcommittee found itself completely 
deadlocked# Julius ICatz*Suchy, Polish representative, 
seemed to find no evidence to support the British charges# 
s^ere*as the Colombian and Australian representatives 
could find nothing against the British case# Unable to 
reach a decision by the deadline, March 10, the subcommittee
 .. . New^ork Times, March 3# 1947»
See Chapter 1# page 10, and Chapter II, pages 15 &18 
for previous examples of Albanian accusations towards 
Greece,
requeated mm extension from the Security Council* The 
Council granted thia request by postponing the hearings 
until March 20* During this time* however* the subcommittee 
still failed to reach an unanimous agreement* As a com̂  
promise the three delegates decided to hand in two reports* 
one supported by Australia and Colombia and the second 
by Poland,
The two reports %ere submitted to the Council on
March 20* They were based on a series of questions and
answers* For the most part* they repeated evidence pre­
sented at previous Security Council meetings. The sub­
committee interpreted the case as involving three technical 
and legal questions upon which the Security Council would 
have to acts
1, lere British destroyers damaged on the night
of October 22?
2* Vfere the ships damaged in a minefield that had
been marked as such?
3* Was Albania responsible or did she know of the
minefield?
Of the three questions* the subcommittee could only agree 
on the first. On the other two* however* there was a 
difference of opinion* The majority report contended that 
Albania was responsible for the minefield incident* It 
admitted that proof was not conclusive to substantiate the 
British charge that Albania had laid the mines* Yet in 
view of the evidence the report concluded that Albania 
must have known that the minefield was present* The 
minority report in turn stated that the only thing known
was that two mines had exploded and that two destroyers 
were damaged. The rest. It reported, “was merely conjecture,’*̂  ̂
In the diseuaslons that followed, Julius Kata-Suchy elaborated 
this point by saying, **There Is only a British statement 
in this respect and as the United Kingdom Is part of this 
dispute the statement cannot be accepted as e v i d e n c e H e  
then suggested that maybe *the mines were adrift'^ or had 
been overlooked in previous sweeping operations* To this.
Sir Alexander sarcastically answered, *A most miraculous 
coincidence,*25 He acknowledged the British charges 
against Albanian had not been proven 100;̂  but that the 
"chain of © v e n t s "26 demonstrated conclusively that Albania 
had either laid the mines herself or knew they were present.
The Polish delegate answered Sir Alexander by suggesting 
that the Council should take no action except to ask 
Albania and the United Kingdom to reopen negotiations.
He based this recommendation upon Article Thirty-three, 
paragraph Two of the Charter^? arihich calls upon parties of 
a dispute to get together and negotiate a friendly settlement.
^2 Security Council Official Records, 2nd year, 
120th meeting, i>, ^59^ 5fEe" fu11l i^porl is~found in SC 
Official Records, 2nd year, "Supplement #10", pp. 77^17&
23 Ibid,, p, 558,
Ibid.. P. 559.
25 Ibid.. p. 56o.
^  i&ld., p. 565.
21 See Appendix,
Sir Alexander lauitedlately answered this proposal by 
stating that the British government had attempted to settle 
the question before bringing It to the Council, but that 
Albanian actions pointed to **no chance whatever of ne- 
gotlating an agreement#**^® He then asked the council to 
atop '^passing the buck** and proposed four resolutions 
for their approval*
1. Finds that a unnotlfled minefield was laid in 
the Corfu Channel by the Albanian government 
or with Its connivance resulting In serious 
injury to Hie Majesty#s ships and loss of life 
and injury to their crews;
2* Recommends that the United Kingdom and the 
Albanian government should settle the dispute 
on basis of the Councils findings in paragraph I 
above, and that in the event of failure to 
settle, either party may apply to the Council 
for further consideration of the matter;
3. Résolves to retain this dispute on its agenda
until both parties certify that it has been
settled to their satisfaction;
4, Reminds all states, whether members of the 
United Rations or not, that it is incumbent on 
them to sweep or pemit to be swept all parts 
of their territorial waters where there is 
reason to suspect the presence of mines
After reading of the resolutions, Bl-Khouri, the 
Syrian delegate made a motion that no vote should be
taken until the delegates had time to examine the sub­
committee reports*
On March 21, discussions were held on the four 
British proposals. During the course of the hearings, the
Security Council Official Record, 2nd Year,
120th meetingV 568*
29 p. 5 67*
American delegate, Johnson, proposed ttro amendments to the 
British resolutionst Although these amendments exemplified 
an American pro*British viewpoint, it concurrently typified 
a desire for oomprcmilse. First of all, Johnson suggested 
that a preamble be added to point number one in place of 
resolution number four, stating, "Considers that the laying 
of mines In peacetime without notification Is unjustified 
and an offense against humanity*"30 secondly he proposed 
that in Resolution I, the words "by the Albanian government 
or with its connivance" should be changed to "Flth the 
knowledge of the Albanian government*"31
In the discussions that followed, Gr<miyko expressed 
the Russian viewpoint by saying that there was no foundation 
whatever for the British proposals and contended that they 
had not been brought for the sake of malntalnenoe of good 
International relations* Kapo continued this argument 
by contending that these proposals only showed Britain* 
"unfriendly attitude to new Albanian democracy*"3^ Graayko 
also referred to a Lloyds Reoort33 which published figures 
to the effect that since the end of the war up to the 
29th of February, 19^7, 226 vessies of various nationalities
- r - n n - M  , " f f e i d  *  *  2tkd ye&T, 1 2 1 s t  S l e C t l n g ,  P *  599 *
31 Ibid*, p* 599*
32 Ibid*, p. 577.
33 Lloyds of London, Insurance Underwriters, is
recognised as the largest Insurer of maritime shipping*
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had been sunk In European water» as a result of nines*
Thus, he continued, how could the British blame Albania 
without substantial proof* Sir Alexander sarcaetloally 
inquired if mathamatIcIans could prove how two mines could 
drift from some other area precisely to the place where 
two destroyers were damaged. Finally as a means of ter-* 
mlnating this bearing. Sir Alexander made a motion for 
adjournment which was immediately accepted by the Council*^
Discussions were continued on the 2$th of March. 
Before the proposal was put to a vote, the French delegate, 
Parodi, suggested several amendments. They v/ere Immediately 
approved by both the American and British delegate and put 
to vote* The amended resolutions were not as sharp as 
those proposed by Sir Alexander, Both retained Articles II 
and III of the British proposals* Yet by modifying Reso­
lution I to read that "the minefield could not have been 
laid without the knowledge of the Albanian authorities” 
Instead of *. * * by their connivance," the passage was 
certainly weakened# This, accompanied with the discarding 
of the fourth British proposal in favor of the more liberal 
preamble of Johnson, made the resolutions milder* The 
amended resolution read as followss
1* Consider that the laying of mines In peace 
time without notification is unjustified and 
an offense against humanity;
2# Finds that an unnotified minefield was laid
 ..   ' " ^  Security Council Official Records, 2nd year,
121st meetîog, pp. 572*?9T«
la the Immediate vicinity of the Albanian 
coast resulting in serious Injury to two of 
His Majesty«S ships with loss of life and 
injury to their crew* That this minefield 
could not have been laid without the knowledge 
of Albanian authorities ;
3* Recommends that the United Kingdom and Albanian 
governiicnts should settle the dispute on the 
Council's findings in paragraph II above# That 
in the event of failure to settle, either party 
may apply to the ccunail for further considera­
tion of the matter* 
i*« Resolved to retain the dispute on its agenda 
until both parties certify that^it has been 
settled to their satisfaction#
The vote was taken by a show of hands with the 
following results: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chill,
Colombia, Prance, and United States for the resolutions; 
Poland and Russia against it; and Syria abstaining# The 
President then stated: *The resolution has failed to
obtain the affirmative vote of one of the five permanent 
members and therefore Is not adopted#**36
Immediately following this vote. Sir Alexander 
stated that he would take a chance on the Polish proposal37 
and that his government would attempt to negotiate directly 
with Albania# Lange, however, answered that he was with­
drawing his resolution because it would no longer **serve 
any useful purpose."38 Thereupon the President, Oswald©
35 Ibid,, p. 609,
36 Ibid.. p. 609.
37 gaa page Chapter III#
38 Security Council Official Record. 2nd year,
121st meeting, p#
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Araxiha» the Braailian delegate moved that the meeting 
adjourn until further notice#
The New York Times, in reporting this event, included 
an interview with the Syrian delegate explaining why he 
had not voted on the four proposals: Kl-Khourl stated
that the whole ease revolved around one point*#»when the 
mines were laid# If they were laid during the war, Albania 
was not responsible; if they were laid after, he went on, 
the Albanian government was obliged to see that they were 
cleared# But unfortunately, "These facts are wanting, 
and a doubt existed in my opinion of this case#"39
No further discussions were held on the Corfu incident 
until April 3* During this interval the feeling grew 
among the Council members that the case should be sent to 
the frorld Court# This sentiment had been expressed by 
some of the delegates even before discussions began in the 
Security Council# Ÿ.arren Austin, the Chief American 
Delegate, in conference with Secretary of State Marshall, 
on January 26, had expressed the opinion that the case 
could best be settled in the International Court of Jus­
tice#^® Also, Eduardo Zuleta Angel, Colombian member of 
the Council, in an interview on February 21, hinted that 
he would make a proposal to refer the case to the Inter­
national Court of Justice.probably this proposal would
Hew York Times, March 27, 1947#
40 Ibid#. January 27, 1947#
4^ Ibid#. February, 22, 1947*
have been Introduced at the February 2l|. meeting of the 
Security Council if the Brltlah delegation had not been 
definitely againot it# Indeed, when Sir Alexander was asked 
to commentCR this propoeed motion, he declared that the 
ease was below the jurisdiction of the ŝ orld Court for, 
he stated, **The Borld Court Is not a police court#
Thus the Australian delegate's proposal to establish a 
subcommittee might have been influenced by a desire to 
offset the possibility of the Colombian delegate bringing 
this proposal before the Council* However, on April 3, 
shen discussions were reopened. Sir Alexander, the United 
Kingdom Delegate, proposed the following motion: "Re­
commended that the United Kingdom and Albania should im­
mediately refer the disput to the Internation Court of 
Justice in accordance with the provisions of the statute 
of the Court."^3
The resolution was immediately supported by the 
delegates of Brasil, Syria, Belgium, and the United states. 
Indeed, Johnson, when comraentlng on the proposal said,
"The United States Delegation wholeheartedly supports the 
resolution."^ The Polish delegate made a motion to post­
pone voting on the resolution on the grounds that the
Ibid., February 22, l?^?.
^ 3  Security Council Official Records* 2nd year,
125th meeting, p. 6B5#
kk Ibid*, p. 686.
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mübeommltt#* report of March 20 ahould be restudled* Thla 
motion was immediately contested by the Belgium delegate.
He contended that the Polish opposition was irrelevant 
to the motion before the oouneil, Thus, when the Polish 
proposal was brought to a vote, only the States of Brazil, 
Poland, Syria, USSR, and the United States voted in favor 
of the motion whereas Australia, Belgium, and Colombia 
voted in the negative, while China, France, and the United 
Kingdom abstained. After the President announced that 
the motion had not carried, the Russian delegate, Gromyko, 
made a motion to adjourn the discussions until April 9# 
on the grounds that he wished to restudy the British 
resolutions. This motion was immediately endorsed by all 
the delegates, and the meeting was adjourned,4$
On April 9» Kapo opened the discussions by expressing 
his disapproval of the British resolution. He argued,
"My country has done nothing to justify the British accusa- 
tions*"46 He urged the council to reject the motion, 
charging that the resolution did not merit being taken 
into consideration. For, he said, Albania was not respon­
sible in any way, and the Council itself "has no proof,"4? 
Sir Alexander answered Kapo by saying the Albanian delegates
Ibid,, p. 687.
46 Security Council Official Records. 2nd year, 
127th meeting, p. 72Ô,
hi Hald.,p.720.
dlsouasions war* *# , * not relevant to this case but 
Irrelevant to our previous disousalona*^^® Colonel W* R, 
Hodgson then asked permission to explain his opinion* He 
declared that* If the case had been one hundred per cent 
proven* it would never have reached the Council in the 
first place* Commenting further he expressed the opinion 
that the delegates had to act on the evidence that was 
presented and could not rely on mere “hearsay* of the 
Albanian delegate. He then concluded his oration by 
c<Mmaenting on the Russian veto of March 25* He charged 
that there had been "a pronounced tendency on the part of 
some members to prejudice the case**49 This he claimed 
"* . * prevented a Just and impartial decision from being 
reached and so stultified the will of the Security Council.*^0 
To this Gromyko answered that the Australian delegate was 
suffering from an Illness which he might characterize as 
"Vetophobla**^^ akin to the English word hydrophobia. He 
then added* "I hope sincerely* and I am quite sure that 
time will cure the Australian representative of this 
i l l n e s s # T h e r e a f t e r  the motion was finally brought 
to a vote. The vote was taken by a show of hands with
Ibld..p.727» 
^9 Ibld.j%721. 




the following reeulta: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chili,
Colombia, France, Syria, and the United States for the 
reeolution; Poland and Eueaia abstained. Quo Tai-chi, 
President of the Council, then announced that the pro­
posal was carried. He then made a motion for adjournment, 
and it was Immediately approved by the delegates.
Thus, the hearings on the Corfu Channel incident in 
the Security Council of the United Nations finally came to 
an end# The Security Council** action on the Corfu Channel 
incident was anything but a success# The discussions had 
started in a logical manner-*-^both Albania and Great Britain 
were allowed to present their side of the case. The 
succeeding meetings, however, were characterized more by a 
desire to misconstrue the facts than to reach a logical 
conclusion.
The Australian proposal to establish a subcommittee 
and its successive acceptance clearly exemplifies the 
Inability of the Security Council to reach a decision.
The subcommittee in turn did nothing but reflect the 
divisions in the Security Council.
The pro-Albanian viewpoint of both Poland and 
Russia throughout the proceedings was self-evident. If 
any doubt existed, it was certainly removed #ien the 
Russian delegate, Gromyko, vetoed the four amended re­
solutions#
54 Ibid.. pp. 720-727.
The Western powers definitely sided in with Bri- 
te in# Both the American and French amendments exemplified 
the desire of the Western bloc to conciliate and compro­
mise#
As s wholey the Albanian arguments were less con­
sistent than the British# Kapo» in presenting the case 
before the subcommittee had professed Albanian innocence 
by raising a charge «gainst Greece# Yet in the initial 
proceedings» when the Albanian side was presented before 
the Security Council» no mention was made of this fact#
In all fairness to the Security Council the pro­
ceedings were successful in a negative sense# The Council 
offered a possibility of solution by placing the emphasis 
on the legal aspects with a minimum amount of attention 
to the political questions involved# This» acctmpanled 
by the time the ease was held up before the Security 
Council» enabled both aides to look upon the question from 
a more logical viewpoint#
CHAPTBR IV
JÏÏDM^SPP OP THE ÎHTERMTIÜNAL COÜHT OF JUSTICE
Following the decision of the Security Council, 
the United Kingdom addressed an application to the Inter­
national Court of Justice. This letter was post marked 
May 22, 19^7, and was sent to the Registrar of the v orld 
Court, Edvard Hamhro, at The Hague, Hetharlands. In the 
application the British government made the following 
claims:
1. That the Albanian government either caused 
to be laid, or had knowledge of the laying 
of mines In its territorial waters In the 
Strait of Corfu without notifying the existance 
of these mines as required by articles III and 
IV of Hague Convention #8, of 1907
2# That two destroyers of the Royal Navy were
damaged by the mines so laid resulting in the 
loss of lives of lj4 personnel of the Royal 
Navy and serious injury to the Destroyers;
3* That the loss and damage referred to in y2
was due to the failure of the Albanian govern­
ment to fulfill Its International obligations 
and to act In accordance with the dictates of 
humanity;
4* That the Court shall decide that the Albanian 
government is Internationally responsible for 
the said loss and injury and Is under an obliga­
tion to make reparations or pay compensation 
to the government of the United Kingdom there­
fore ; and
 . For Articles III and IV of the Hague Convention, 
see Appendix#
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5* That the Court a^ll determine the reparation 
or eompanaatlon*2
In its appeal» the United Kingdom contended that 
the Court had Jurisdiction under Article XXXVI» Paragraph I» 
of its statute; « as being a matter specifically
provided for in the Charter of the United Nations.
This contention was based on the following points;
le That the Security Council of the United Nations»
on April 9» 19^6* had reeoatnended that both the
Governments of the United Kingdom and Albania 
should refer the dispute to the International 
Court of Justice.
2. That the Tirana government» by accepting the 
Security Council's invitation to participate 
in the discussions automatically assumed all 
the obligations which a member of the United 
Nations would assume in a similar case.
3* That the Charter (Article XXV) laid on members 
the obligation of accepting and carrying out 
the decisions of the Security Council.^
On May 23» it was officially announced in London 
that the British government would be represented by A. E. 
Becket» Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office, and Sir 
Hartley Shawcrosa.^ The same day, Hambro sent both a letter 
and a telegram to the Albanian government informing them 
of Britain's application to the iorld Court. Then, fulfilling
^ The Corfu Channel Case (6 volumes, Leyden, Holland, 
Published as follows ; Vol. Ï, 19481 Vol. 2, 19^9! Vol. 3» 
1949; Vol. k» 1950; Vol. 5, 1950; Vol. 6, 1950.) I» p. 9.
3 IMd*» I. p. 9
^ Ihid., I» pp. 8*9# For Article XXV, see Appendix.
^ yew York Times, May 2l+» 1947»
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requirements of Article XL, Paragraph III,& he sent a 
similar message to the Security General of the United 
Nations, Trygve Lie*
The official Albanian recognition of the British 
application was submitted to The Hague on July 23*? In 
this letter, Tirana also requested the Registrar to bring 
an additional statement to the knowledge of the Court*
It charged that the British government, in instituting 
these proceedings *, * * has not eomiüed with the re com* 
mandations adopted by the Security Council**® for, it 
stated, the British government should have first conferred 
with the Albanian government and reached an agreement 
before submitting the dispute to the ^orld Court* Never­
theless, the letter concluded, the Albanian government 
fully accepted the recommendation of the Security Council,
* * notwithstanding Its irregularity in the action taken 
by the government of the United Kingdom to appear before
the Court**9
The President of the Court was Jose Gustavo Guerrero, 
of El Salvador* Since the Court was not in session, he 
issued an order on July 31, 1947, to the governments of
® See Appendix*
7 The letter was dated July 2* but was not deposited 
with the Registrar until July 23, 1947#
® Corfu Channel Case, II, p* 25#
9 Ibia.. II, pp. 25-26.
-58-
Brlt&ln and Albania# By this order he scheduled the dates 
for the presentation of their briefs. The Memorial of the 
United Kingdom and the Counter«Memorial of Albania were 
to be submitted to the Court by October 1, and December 10, 
respectively.
The British Memorial was submitted to the Court on 
October 1, It was a detailed and comprehensive study.
Hot only did it contain a complete list of casualties and 
damages done to the ships but a full synopsis of the 
Security Council»s proceedings. Reports were also Included 
of the mine-aweeping operations of November 12 and 13, 
as well as photographs illustrating recovery and identi­
fication of the mines. In conclusion the British delegate 
asked the Court to adjudge and declare the following 
points X
1, That on October 22, 191+6, damage was caused 
to His Majesty’s c Ips Saumarez end Volage 
which resulted in ; ath“and injuries to %  men 
and personal Injuries to ^2;
2# That the aforesaid minefield was laid between
l$th May 19^6, and 22nd October, 1946, by^or
with the connivance or knowledge of the Albanian
government;
3, That the Albanian government knew that the said 
minefield was lying in a part of its territorial 
waters which was being used as an international 
highway for maritime traffic|
4# That the Albanian Government did not notify the
existance of these mines as required by the Hague 
Convention No, 8 of 1907, in accordance with the 
general principles of international law and 
humanity.
5, That the Albanian government failed to warn his
M&jeety** «hlpa of the danger of the said mines 
of which the Albanian government or Its agents 
were well aware*
6, Existence of the minefield in the North Corfu 
Channel without notification was a violation 
of the right of innocent passage*
7* That the passage of His Majesty’s ships through 
the North Corfu channel on the 22nd of October, 1914̂6, was an exercise of the right of innocent 
passage*
8* That even if for any reason it is held that con­
clusion #7 is not established, the Albanian 
government is not thereby relieved of its inter­
national responsibility for the damage caused to 
the ships*
9* The Albanian government has ccmmitted a breech 
of its obligations under International law and 
is internationally responsible to His Majesty’s 
government for the deaths. Injuries and damage 
caused to his Majesty's ships*
10. That the Albanian government is under an obliga­
tion to make reparation in respect of the breech 
of its international obligations*
11* That his Majesty's government sustained the 
following damages :
Damage of H*M*S. Saumarez x
(Total Loss)* « • • • • • * •  *7$0,000 
Damage of H.M.S* Volage* * • • • * •  75*000 
Compensation for death# and injuries
of Naval personnel* « » * • * * $0,000
TOTAL. . .875,00010
On the day appointed, Tirana did not submit a counter- 
Memorial* Instead the Albanian government sent a Pre­
liminary Objection to the British application* In brief, 
the Albanian objection statedt
1* To place on record that, in accepting the
Security Council's recommendation of 9 April, 
the Albanian Government had only undertaken to
The Corfu Channel Case, I, pp* 19“ ^03*
submit the dispute to the Court In accordance 
with the provisions of its statute; and
2# To give Judgment that the United Kingdom ap­
plication was "Inadmissible,** because it con­
travened the provisions of Articles Xh and XXXVI of the Court's Statute.
AS a result, on December 10, the President sent a 
second order to the British Government. He requested them 
to submit a written reply to the Albanian objection by 
January 20, 19li-8.
British circles were anything but pleased. Yet, 
desiring to conform with the Court's will, the British 
reply was presented to Hambro on January I9* It charged 
the Albanian government with "an abuse of the process of 
the Court."12 %n conclusion, it called upon the Albanian 
government to comply with the terms of the President's 
order of July 31 without "further delay."13
The International Court of Justice was called into 
session on February 2k§ 194#* The members of the Court 
were Laejandro Alvarez, Chile; Jose Phlladelpho de Barros 
Azevedo, Brazil; Jules Basdevant, France; Jose Gustavo 
Guerrero, El Salvador; Sir Arnold Duncan MoHalr, United * 
Kingdws; Isidro Fabela Alfaro, Mexico; Green H. Hackworth,
U. S. A.; Helge Elaestad, Norway; Sergei Borisovich Krylov, 
U.3.S.R.; Charles de Visscher, Belgium; Abdel H&mld Badawl 
Pasha, Egypt; Hus Mo, China; John E. Read, Canada; Bogdan
T i  Ibid.. II, pp. 9-13. For Articles 3# 4# aee
Appendix.
12 Ibid.. II, p. 23.
Ibid.. II, pp.
Winiarakî, Poland; Milovon %orlele, Yugoalavla, a s  the 
Court did not have upon its bench a Judge of Albanian 
nationality, the Albanian government, in accordance with 
Article XXXVI, Paragraph 2,^^ appointed Dr, Igor Daxnep 
who was President of the Supreme Court of Czechoslovakia,
Public hearings were held on February 26, 27, and 28 
and on March 1, 2 and 5» 194&# The Albanian government 
was represented by N, Kahreman Yilll, Albanian Minister 
to Paris, and M, V, Vochoc and M. I* Lapenna, Professors 
of International Law, Britain was represented by Pro­
fessors H, Lauterpacht, H, lïaldock, and R, 0, Wilberforce, 
Sir Hartley Shawcross, J, M, Jones, and M, E. Reed, The 
Albanian representatives charged that unless a state had 
previously accepted compulsory jurisdiction, it went to 
the Court of Its own free will. Consequently, Britain's 
unilateral application was contrary to the charter of the 
World Court* Sir Shawcross answered that the Preliminary 
Objection was a"flagrant violation of the Resolutions of 
the Security C o u n c i l , H e  held that the Security Council 
recommendation was binding upon both parties. Therefore, 
the case fell within the compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
Court, On March $, the President declared the hearings 
closed,
%  See Appendix for Article XXXI, Paragraph 2,
The Corfu Channel Case, III, p* 63,
Ibid.. Ill, pp. 8-159.
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The JudgjHiefit came on March 25, 194&* By a vote of
15-1 the Court rejected the Albanian Preliminary Objection*
The dleaenting vote was cast by Igor Daxner. The Court
held that the reservations contained in the Albanian
government's letter of July 2, X̂ k7$ were Intended only
to maintain a principle and in no way substantiated the
Preliminary Objection. Time limits were also fixed for
the subsequent pleadings according to the following
schedule t
Counter<«Memorial of the Albanian'
Government . . . . . .  15 June, 19^8
Reply of the United Kingdom . . . . 2 August, I94Ô
BeJoinder of Albania. . . . . . .  20 September, X946
The dissenting opinion of Daxner was also included in the
Judgment# He stated that the British application "was
irregular"!? and "that the Preliminary Objection should
have been upheld."!^ Judges Basdevant, Alvares, %iniarski,
Borlcic, DeVisscher, Badawl Pasha and Krylov, while agree*
ing with the Courtes Judgment, appended the statement by
including individual opinions. The latter seven Judges
stated that they wished the Court had passed upon the
United Kingdom's claim of "compulsorary jurisdiction of
the Court." All contended that Jurisdiction depended
upon the consent of both parties, irrespective of the
Security Council's recommendation.
Th« lntern>tlon*l Coyrt of Justice, “Reports of 
Judgments (Leyden, fioileûd, 19^^ ) » P' 45#
Ibid., p. U5.
Immediately after the reading of this judgment,
Yllll submitted to the Court an agreement which had been 
reached between the governments of Albania and Britain, 
Beckett In turn confirmed this, and the Special Agreement 
waa presented to the Court, This agreement was a compromise 
between both nations. By it Albania and Britain agreed 
to submit to the Court the following questionsf
1, Is Albania responsible under International 
law for the explosions which occurred on the 
22nd of October 191̂ 6 in Albanian waters and for 
the damage and loss of human life which resulted 
frcsa them and Is there any duty to pay com*» 
pensatlon?
2, Has the United Kingdom under International law 
violated the sovereignty of the Albanian People's 
Republic by reason of the acts of the Royal 
Havy in Albanian Mters on the 22nd of October 
and on the 12th and 13th of November, 19l|6,
and Is there any duty to give satisfaction, I?
Following this declaration the President declared the 
hearing closed,
As a result of this agreement the Court issued a 
special order on March 26, The order stated that the 
special agreement would now form the basis of further 
proceedings
The Counter-Memorial of the Albanian rovemment was 
submitted to the Registrar on June 15» 19^0# answer
to #1, the brief presented six conclusionst
-vr The Corfu Channel Case, II, p, 29,
Judgments
International Court of Justice, "Reports of 
/eto;“
1* That the Albanian government has never laid 
mlnea or minefields in its waters•
2, That the Albanian government possesses no 
knowledge of the alleged mines*
3# That the British Claims in connection with
the mines in the North Corfu Channel# especially 
as to the time of their presence in the waters# 
their number# types# location and removal# 
has established no proof against the Albanian 
government*
l|* That the Albanian government is not responsible 
to the British government for the explosions# 
damages and losses of life which occurred in 
the Corfu Channel on October 22, 191J.6*
5* That the conclusions of the British government 
ought to be rejected as being contrary to law 
and contrary to fact.
6. That in view of the odious character of the 
British accusation# the United Kingdom ought 
to present to the Albanlan government an apology 
"in good and due fora*
The Second question was summarized in two main arguments:
1* That the British maneuvers in the North Corfu 
Channel on October 22# 194&* were a violation 
of the sovereign rights of the Albanian states 
and was especially not "innocent passage."
2* That the British Navy on the 12th and 13th of 
November violated Albanian sovereignty "by the 
aide of f o r c e a n d  by so doing acted contrary 
to Article V of the Hague Convention #8 of1907*23
The British answer was submitted to the Court on 
July 30# 19%^. Contrary to the Counter-*Memorial it asked
The Corfu Channel Case* II# pp* 30^106. Quote 
from p. lOo*
22 Ibid., II# p* l!|3.
23 Ibid., II# pp. 106-llj.6. ^or Article V of the 
Hague Convention# see Appendix*
the Court to Judge end declare the following pointer
1# Relating to the October 22, 19l|6 Incident:
a] That the passage of the squadron through 
the Corfu Channel wa. an c srslse of right 
of innocent passage and Inv-i/ed no viola­
tion of Albanian sovereignty#
b) That with the exception of the two destroy­
ers injured by mines no vessel of this , 
squadron entered Albanian interior waters#^
o) That nothing done by any vessel of this 
squadron constituted a violation of any 
Albanian right#
d) That the (swept) Corfu Channel is an inter­
national highway which is subject to inter­
national law of the Hague Convention of1907.
e) The Albanian notice of Kay, 194^, requiring 
foreign warships and mereant ships to obtain 
permission of the Albanian authorities before 
navigating through the Corfu (swept) channel 
is not Justified under international law#
2# Relating to the Minesweeping operations of
November 12 and 13, 19^6#
a) That the United Kingdom was legally justi­
fied in sweeping the channel for mines#
b) That no violation of any Albanian right was 
done by any British vessel during the opera­
tion of sweeping#
3# That all allegations made in the Counter-Memorial 
regarding passage of the squadrons on October 22, 
and November 12 and 13, should be rejected.
I4.# That the government of the United Kingdom has
committed no violation of the rights of Albania 
under International law and in conaequenoe^owes to Albania no apologies or satisfaction."25
The Albanian rejoinder was presented to the Court 
on September 20, 19^8, As a whole it reiterated the find­
ings submitted in the Counter-Memorial# It stated, "The
^4 Thisreport stated that none of the ships were 
maneuvering in Albanian interior waters and that the two 
destroyers did so only after the explosion because of 
meohanical difficulties#
Corfu Channel Case, II, PP* 2)4.1-310#
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Albanian government maintain» the conclusion presented
to the Court In It» Counter-Memorial,*̂ 6
The Court assembled on November 2, 19̂ 8, to review 
the declarations of the two governments. The Albanian 
government again availed itself of Its rights under Article 31, 
Paragraph II. However, Instead of nominating Igor Daxner, 
as in the preliminary hearings, they appointed Bohesulalav 
Ecer.27 Public sittings were held by the Court on the 
following dates; 9-12, 15-19» 22-26, 28 and 29 of Novem­
ber; I-I4., 6-11, 13, 14, and 17th December, 1948*^^
During these sessions, the Court heard arguments 
by the representatives of both parties. The British case 
was presented jointly by Sir Hartley Shawcross, Sir Eric 
Beckett, and Sir Frank Soskice. Alganla was represented 
by Kahreman Yllll,. J. Nordmann and Pierre Cot,^ Britain's 
case centered around two main point»--that the British
Ibid.. II, p. 313-376.
27 Mr, Ecer was a Doctor of Law and a Professor 
on the Faculty of Law at Brno, Czechoalavakia,
For full hearings of this phase of the case, see 
The Corfu Channel Case, III, pp# 6-694#
Cot, Pierre, LLD, French politician; b '95; 
Radical Socialist Deputy; Legion of Honor, 1914; Under 
Secretary in Paul-Boncour Cabinet '32; Minister for Air in 
Delaider, Sarraut and Ghautemps Cabinets, '33**’34; Bluai 
Cabinet, June *36- June '37, and in Chautemps Cabinet 
June '37. Advocater at Court of Appeals; Professor of Law, 
University of Rennes, Lecturer at Yale University; Member 
Provisional Consultative Assembly 1943, Member of the 
Union of Progressive Republicans and of French Association 
for the United Nations.
m()ym
squadron had not violated Albanian sovereignty and that 
tha mines eouXd not have been laid without the knowledge 
of the Albanian government» These arguments were eup* 
ported by testimony of the Ctmmanders of both the Volage 
and Sumareg as well as the Captains of the Cruisers Wander 
and Mauritius* All of these officers stated that the 
ships were passing through the channel in innocent passage* 
They further testified that the guns on all four of tae 
ships were unloaded and not aimed at the Albanian shore* 
Pierre Cot answered by claiming that the British ships 
had been maneuvering in forbidden waters* He then presented 
to the Court a series of documents to substantiate this 
fact* The documents contained observations of the Albanian 
coastal authorities for the day of October 22, 19l|̂ 6* Besides 
sustantiating this point, the statement also chained that 
the ships were carrying a supplement of soldiers, Bir 
Hartley denied this charge by presenting evidence that 
showed that the ships were only carrying their normal 
marine detachments * He then twisted the Albanian evidence 
to support the British case* For he stated. If the Albanian 
coastal authorities could pick out marine detachments, how 
could anyone mine the channel without their knowledge?
Sir Hartley then introduced Lieutenant Commander 
Karol Koraolteh, a former Yugoslavian Haval O f f l e e r , 3 0
Kovaoltch had fled on July 19, l?!̂ ? 
in a sailing dinghy to Italy and had been granted political 
asylum.
Hit teatlmony w«t probably the most startling of the nhole 
session, in so far as It provided testimony regarding the 
responsibility for the laying of the mines# The absence 
of any such proof was the weakest link in the British ease# 
This proof was furnished by the testimony of Commander 
Kovacitch# Before introducing the witness# Sir Hartley said# 
•Our ease is against Albania and not Y u g o s l a v i a # m e n  
the witness was called to the stand# Sir Frank asked him 
to relate his knowledge of the mine lay ing*
Commander Kovacitch stated that on October 17# he 
had observed mines bei% loaded aboard the Yugoslavian 
ships Mljet and Meljlne# Later after inquiry among their 
officers he had learned that the ships had been involved 
in a minelaying operation# Immediately after this testi* 
mony# Pierre Got# asked permission to question the witness.
He conducted his cross examination in such a way as to 
question the Commander’s character# He asked Kovacitch 
whether or not he was a deserter from the Yugoslavian 
Havy# Comaander Kovacitch was forced to answer yea, Pierre 
Cot then presented to the Court an official oomminique 
from the Yugoslavian government* This note denied Com­
mander Kovacitoh’s testimony completely and further stated# 
•That there are no such ships in the Yugoslavian N a v y . *32
Joseph Hordiaann then took over the Albanian case#
Corfu Channel Case# III# p, 2]|0*
32 Ibid.# V# p# 99# For complete comminique see 
PP* 99*101#^
H# stated that It was absured to say that Albania would 
aommlt suoh a foul act# "Albania has no Navy, no Air 
Fora#, and only a very small Army. I'ho can possibly be­
lieve that such a country would embark upon such an ad­
venture in the course of which it might lose its inde­
pendence."^^ He then brought out the charge that Greece 
al^ t be the culprit. For he stated, "Had not the Greek 
government the greatest interest in increasing the tension 
between Britain and Albania,"3^
Pierre Cot stressed the point that the British 
maneuvers of October 22, were not innocent passage, but 
rather, " . . .  it was a mission to see whether the Albanian 
government would behave itself or fire once more as it 
had done the previous May.*35 then reiterated that the 
guns of the ships were aimed at the Albanian shore. Sum­
marizing the Albanian position, he stated, "The truth is 
simply that the warships sought to impose by force the 
British Government's own interpretation of innocent pas- 
sage."3^
After this conflicting testimony the Court was placed 
in an awkward position. If it were to accept the evidence
Ibid., Ill# P* 312. 
^  Ibid.. Ill# p. 33l̂ < 
Ibid.# Ill# p. 390. 
Ibid.. Ill, p. koQ.
submitted by the British, It would have no choice but to 
Judge Albania guilty. If It were to accept the Albanian 
viewpoint, British charges must be completely false. la 
an attempt to evaluate the evidence, the Court appointed 
a committee of experts Including the following; Lieutenant 
Commander S. jr. W. Biff ©rich of the Royal Netherlands 
Navy, Commodore S. A. Forahell of the Royal Swedish Navy, 
and Commodore jr. Bull of the Royal Norwegian Navy. The 
order was issued on December 17, 19^#, and stated; "Cer­
tain pointa have been contested between the Parties which 
make it necessary to obtain on expert opinion,*37 There­
upon the President declared the hearings closed and post­
poned any further sittings until January 17, 1949#
The report of the Cmnmlttee of exports was sub­
mitted to the International Court of Justice on January 8, 
1949* The terms of the December 17th offer had asked the 
experts to answer several questions. Their answers were 
"unanimous,* Among the questions were:
1. How effective was the mine clearance carried 
on by the Royal Navy In 1944^
That the sweeping of a moored minefield if 
carried out in the proper v/ay can be considered 
100;̂ safe.
2. Were the ships hit by floating mines?
The nature of the damage sustained by the 
Saumares and Volage excludes the faintest 
possTfcllity of its cause being a floating mine.
3^ International Court of Justice# "Reports of 
Judgments, etc., 19i|-t**4̂ , PP# *%-127#
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3« %hat type of mine# struck the vessels?
Dftmege must have been caused by the explosion 
of a moored contact mine of approximately 600# charge#
4* the mines moored before or after ZZ October.1946?
With nothing more than general information 
all we are prepared to state with certainty is 
that the mines could not possibly belong to a 
minefield laid during the war,*3"
In view of these findings the Court issued a subsequent 
order on January 17* to the Cixamittee, By this order the 
three experts were requested to proceed to the North 
Corfu Channel and **conduct firsthand observations#"39 
The report of this investigation was submitted to the 
Court on February 8# 19̂ 1*9* Its findings were quite start­
ling# The experts considered it to be "indisputable" 
that* if look-outs were equipped with binoculars# "The 
minesweeping operations shown in the United Kingdom Memo­
rial must have been noticed by these coastguards,"^^
They stressed the point that look-outs on Cape Kiephali, 
Benta Point and San Giorgio Mongstary could not help but 
notice the mine laying.
The hearings were again opened on January 17 and
International Court of Justice# "Report of 
Judgement a# et c. * 1%^!*" PP* lljS-XSl*
39 Ibid.. p# 151#
40 Ibid,* pp. 152-161. Quote is from page 161, 
Commander BuTT did not take part in this Investigati<WEi 
because of illness.
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continued on through the 22nd, Proceedings during this 
time were primarily a reiteration by both sides present^ 
lag the highlights of their case, Soskice, representing 
the British government summarized the British case by 
stating! "The Albanian government * a case should be re-» 
garded as one which is indeed difficult to support 
Pierre Cot answered this by saying, "The decisions of the 
Government of Albania are legitimate, Thereupon, the 
President, on January 22, called the hearings closed and 
the Court withdrew into closed session,43
On April 9, 1949# the Court, in full session, de* 
livered its Judgment, The Court held, by 11 votes to 5, 
that Albania was responsible for the explosions of the 
two destroyers on the 22nd of October 1946# By 10 votes to 
6, the Court reserved for further consideration the assess­
ment of the amount of compensation. On the question of 
the British violation of Albanian sovereignty, the Court 
voted l4-2 that the United Kingdom did not violate 
Albanian sovereignty on the 22nd of Cctober, 1946, However 
the Court held unanimously that the British government had
The Corfu Channel Case, IV, p. 497#
^  Ibid.. IV, p. 683,
President Guerrero was ill and the Vloe President, 
Judge Basdevant acted as President during the hearings 
of January 17*22, On February 26, 1949, J^dge Basdevant 
was elected President and Judge Guerrero, Vice-President,
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violated Albanian aoverelgnty on the 12th and 13th of 
November
On the firat point the Five Judges who did not agree 
with the majority's findings were: Judges Bogdan felniar-
akl of Polandjp Abdel Hamid Badawl Paaha of Egypt, Surge 
Borlaoultch Drylov of the Soviet Union, Jose Philadelphie 
de Asevedo of Brasil, and Buhunalav Beer of Gseehoalovakia# 
Bach of these Judges added a statement of their individual 
opinions# They insisted that the facts were not conclusive 
enough to substantiate the question of "Albanian know* 
ledge»" Judges Bogdan Wlniarski of Poland, Abdel Hamid 
Badawl Paaha of Egypt, Surge Borisouitch Krylov of the 
Soviet Union, Jose Philadelphio de Azevedo of Brasil, 
Guhuslav Ecer of Czechoslovakia and Basdevant, of France 
voted in the negative on the second point# They all 
contended that the Special agreement asked the Court only 
whether Albania was or was not to pay compensation and not 
to assess the amount# Judges Krylov of the USSR and 
Azevedo of Brazil oast the negative vote on the third 
issue* They concluded that the British Navy, on October 22 
had violated Albanian sovereignty* as stated previously, 
the Judges were unanimous on the British actions of Novem* 
bar 12 and 13* In this opinion the Judgment stated that 
British actions were an intervention of Albanian sovereignty
^  This mine sweeping operation was referred to 
In the World Court proceedings as "Operation Retail*"
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and can be looked upon "as a laanlfeatatlon of a policy 
of fore© «**̂ 5 Commenting on this point It added, "For 
from the nature of things. It would be reserved for the 
moat powerful states and might easily lead to perverting 
the Administration of International J\:tloe."^&
After the presentation of this Judgment, the Court 
presented an order to the Governments of the United Kingdom 
and Albania* By this order the t^o governments were asked 
to submit briefs for the assessment of compensation. The 
time limits were as follower
June 25, 19^9 • • • Submission by Albania of its
observations on amount demanded 
by the United Kingdom.
July 2$, 1949 • • • Submission of the United Kingdom
reply. ,
August 25, 19*4-9 * • Submission of Albanian reply.^*
The Albanian viewpoint of this judgment was expressed 
in a radio broadcast reported by the New York Time a. In 
this commentary, Tirana stated, "Judgement was unjust and 
nonsense." It further elaborated this point by quoting 
the Albanian newspaper, Bashklml. This newspaper had 
written that the " . . .  Incident of the Corfu Channel was 
an act of provocation against Albania concocted by British 
Imperialists with a view of realizing definite ends with
International Court of Justice, "Reports of 
Judgements, Etc.," 194^# P# 3^*
Ibid., p. 35. The judgement of April 9# 1949, 
as well as "Elasentlng opinions. Pp. 4~131*
Ibid.. pp. 171-172.
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regard to our Country#**^® The 25th of June oazne and no
word wad received fr(xn the Albanian government* However,
on June 29, a letter was deposited with the Registrar.
This note completely repudiated the right of the Court to
assess the amount of compensation. The letter ended by
stating that Albania ”. . .  sees no need for including
such information."^9
In view of this, the Court issued another order of
June 29» This order extended the time limits for the
subsequent declarations. The deadline for the Albanian
observation was changed to July 1, the United Kingdom
reply to August 1, and the Albanian reply to September 1.
In spite of this the Albanian government still failed
to submit any declaration. The British reply, however,
was submitted to the Court on July 28, 1949# It listed
the following damages t ^
In respect of H.M.S. Saumarez • . « , « «  700,007
In respect of H.M.S. Volage . * . . . . .  93,812
In respect of deaths and injuries of  ̂ go
Havy personnel .. . . .  . # #  5_Q̂ _Qk8
8%j,9k7
On September 30, the Registrar, Hambro informed the 
British and Albanian governments that public hearings
Hew York Times, April l6, 1949#
^9 Corfu Channel Case, II, P# 400#
50 tbid-. II. D. 394* For the complete British
declaratlo^;j Pp: 390-394#
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would begin on November I7, 191̂.9,51 spiU of this 
letter no word was received from the Albanian government*
€xk November 15 however, a telegram was received from 
Tirana roexpressing the opinion of the letter of June 29*^2 
Although no Albanian Consuls were present, the 
hearings began on the designated day* The Court heard 
statements by Sir Eric Eeckett and Sir Frank Soskice*
They asked the Court to invoke Article 53 of the Court 
Statute* According to this Article, when one party does 
not appear before the Court, the other party may call upon 
the Court to decide in favor of its clalm#^^
After this request. Judge Krylov asked Sir Trie,
**If the Albanian government tried to approach you with 
the Intention to come to the settlement of the question 
of conpensation***^ Sir Eric answered that he had received 
a letter from the Albanian government* But he continued, 
replied to that letter on the 12th of September and I 
would like to read to the Court one sentence from my reply—  
tThat the procedure before the Court should not be Inter­
rupted and that the Court must be left to give its judgment
IbldT, V, p. 286*
^2 Ibid.* V, p. 288*
See Appendix for Article 53#
The Corfu Channel Case, Iv, p* ?06* For complete 
procedure of tBle liearing,see pp* 702-712* These facts 
are presented as euèh for, except for this hearing I did 
not come across this information*
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on the amount of damages.»*’ K© further acknowledged that a 
similar letter had been received on October If, but added, 
"ITe again said we wished the proceedings before the Court 
to continue*"55 After this questioning, the President 
announced the hearings closed. On Kovember 19, 19lf9, the 
Court appointed a Committee to evaluate the British Claim* 
The members were Bear Admiral J. P. Berck of the Royal 
Netherlands Navy and Mr. G. deRooy, Director of Naval 
Construction in the Royal Netherlands Navy, The findings 
of these experts were submitted to the Court on December 1, 
1949* The report completely justified the British claims, 
"as a fair and accurate estimate of the damages sustained.
The Court assembled on December 15, 1949 and formally 
presented its judgment. By a vote of 12-2 it upheld the 
British D0clarat|on*57 The dissenting votes were cast by 
Judges Krylov of the 0SSR and Ecer of Czechoslovakia*
Judge Krylov did not present a dissenting opinion, but 
Ecer did. Ho stated that the British Claim did not take 
into consideration the question of depreciation; therefore.
Vice President, Guerrero was acting President 
since President Basdevant was in New York representing 
the Court in the General Assembly,
56 International Court of Justice, "Reports and 
Judgements, etc., 19497 PP* This committee only
evaluated the damages to the ships. As far as compensation 
for the dead and wounded, the Court accepted the British 
Documents,
57 The President, M. Bastevant was representing the 
Court at the United Nations General Assembly whereas 
Judge Eabela was unable to be present for reasons of 
health. The Corfu Channel Case, IV, p. 702,
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the amount awarded to the United Kingdom was altogether 
too high# He then closed his statement by saying that the 
Judgment "* # * rejects the rule that a sum In respect of 
depreciation must be deducted from the building cost without 
assigning any reason In law for doing so# %hat would be the 
effect of this principle in practice is a matter of cal­
culation#*^®
In spite of the Courtes decision no word was re­
ceived from the Albnaian government* Therefore, on January 18, 
19?0, the United Kingdom sent a note to the Albanian govern­
ment asking for payment#^9 The British letter was answered 
on March 1I4,, 1950 when the Albanian government announced 
its willingness to enter negotiations for payaent#^^
Discussions were opened on April llj., in Paris* Behar 
Shtylla and Sir Eric Beckett of Albania and Britain respec­
tively led the two delgations# As a sign of concilliation, 
Shtylla offered to pay 1|0,000 Founds for the casulaties#®^
Yet in spite of this offer, the Albanian legation refused 
to commit itself as to whether Albania accepted the Court#*
 ̂ 36  International Court of Justice, ^Reports of 
Judgements, etc#," p# 2577 For complete Judgement
see pages 244*257*
59 This information was obtained in a letter sent 
to Arthur A. Bennett from the British Information Service 
on August o, 1953*
60 British Information Service Letter, August 6,
1953, p. 1
The British government has not received any 
compensation from the Albanian government. British Informa­
tion Service letter to Arthur A# Bennett, September 24» 1953*
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liability under the award* Thus, on June 29, 1951, Sir 
Ernest D&viee, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affaire, 
announced in the House of Commons that the dl eussions 
had closed without any agreement
After this failure no direct actions &ere attempted 
by either side* British hesitancy to press the issue was 
well stated in a comaent made by Sir Davies in the House 
of Commons on March 1, 1951* %hen the question was asked 
on Albanian failure to pay. Sir Ernest stated:
Albania is a country which is no larger than ?ales 
and has a population of only a little over one million. 
There is no record of any trade with the United King­
dom at the present time and before the war the trade 
was roughly only 6,000 Pounds a year, vthlch is obviously 
negligible* It has no assets abroad or assets known 
to be transferable. « • * Perhaps It is not out of 
place to say also that the Albanian Government happens 
to be a Communist Government who do not respect the 
rule of law or the principles of international law 
as do the western democracies. ^
Meanwhile it became known that Albania could raise 
a claim to specific foreign assets in gold. % e n  German 
troops evacuated Rome in 19l|3# they had taken with them a 
gold reserve valued at |2,600,000.^^ Previously, in 1939# 
Italian occupation of Albania had been accompanied with 
the movement of Albanian assets to Rcme, How therefore, 
both Albania and Italy claimed the gold reserve which was
5j»itfiiin Information Service letter of August 6,
1953# P# 1.
^3 Ibid., p. 2.
61*. The background of this German looting as well as 
the amount was presented in a Hew York T_imes comment on 
May 2, 1951#
deatiæû to bo returned to Ita rightful oimers* The three 
nation* responaibXe for this disbursment were the United 
States, United Kingdom and France* Thus, on April 2$, 1951» 
the three powers agreed to ask the International Court 
to name an arbitrator to rule on the conflicting claims.
The three governments further agreed that if Albania were 
awarded the decision, the gold would be delivered to Britain 
in partial satisfaction of the Court** Judgment *. . . 
unless within 90 days from the date of the arbitrators* 
opinion, either country makes applicatloa to the Inter­
national Court against this d e c i s i o n . A n  arbitrator 
was chosen by the International Court and a meeting of 
the representatives of Albania and Italy was held in 
Brussels, Belgium, on November 5, 1951.^^ The oral hear­
ings took place in September, 1952, and on February 20,
671953 the gold was awarded to the Albanian government*^'
Selwyn Lloyd, Minister of State commented in the House 
of Coms&onB on April ig, 1953» that he hoped the gold would 
now be given to the British government*^^ However, on 
June 10, 1953 it was announced in the House of Commons 
that the Italian government had appealed the arbitrators*
' British Information Service letter of August 6,
1953.
66 Ibid., p. 3.
68
67 1,90, e U,
Loo * pit *
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deelelon to the International Court of Justice,
The %orld Court proceedings may be divided into 
three main phases— ‘Albanian preliminary objection, Judg** 
ment on the special agreement, and the decision on the 
amount of compensation. The first part was scmiewhat of 
a draw. The Court upheld the British application but 
not on the grounds of the Security Council resolution, 
but rather because of the Albanian letter of July 2, 191̂ 8, 
The second question or the real core of the case 
was viciously contested by both sides. The Court was 
confronted with a ma&e of conflicting evidence. Being 
unable to Judge which facts were right, the Court appointed 
a eoaiaittee of experts to evaluate the testimony. These 
experts completely upheld the British contention that 
"the mines could not have been laid without the knowledge 
of the Albanian government," On the report of these experts, 
the Court Judged Albania guilty. Yet showing Its thor* 
oughness, the Court also ruled that British action in 
sweeping the channel was illegal and a "manifestation of 
a policy of force,"
The amount of compensation was not even contested 
by the Albanian government. Yet the Court's fairness was 
exemplified in the nominating of a Committee of experts 
to evaluate the British claim. Then and only then did
^9 British Information Service letter of August 6,
1953t P* 3.
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thft Court QTmt the British amount*
the voting was not on East and West lines* Of the 
Wiole Court only the Judges of Albania and the USSR voted 
eonslatently for one side#
Since this time, however, the British government has 
not sons latently or strongly pressed Albania for payment* 
Thus, It may be Inferred that Britain was more interested 
in upholding the principles involved than the receivement 
of payment* Yet, the willingness of Albania to make a 
token payment represents a concession to the British view­
point in the dispute*
CHAPTBH V 
CONCLUSION
The bickering end melodrama that accompanied the 
Corfu Channel Incident were certainly overplayed* If both 
sides had truly desired to negotiate, the event could have 
been easily settled in a matter of weeks, Albanian actions 
were spurred more by a desire to raise Insinuations and 
counter charges than to settle the dispute* Britain in 
turn, although somewhat more tactful, was just as uncom­
promising* Nevertheless, each aide had good reasons for 
its actions* British policy during the war of supporting 
the more conservative resistance groups had aroused the 
suspicions of the Hoxha regime* In view of the existing 
pro-Greek policy of Britain, the Albanian nation could 
not help but look upon the United Kingdom as the instigator 
of Greek demands for Southern Albania* Albanian relations 
with Britain both following the war and up to the incident 
itself were definitely unfriendly* Thus this friction 
was responsible for the momentum of this incident even 
though peace existed between the two nations#
The most outstanding feature was the Hast-Vest con­
flict* Albanian aggressiveness would be difficult to 
explain except in the light of the fact that she was an 
ally of Russia* If she had not been certain of Russian
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support her attitude would no doubt have been different.
In the eame light, Britain could have been more forceful 
if she would have had to deal only with Albania. Instead, 
the British government did not officially protest until 
the charges had been substantiated by the findings of the 
Zone Mine Clearance report.
The Security Council’s failure in this case can 
certainly be blamed on the East-Best schism. The Eastern 
bloc, represented by Russia and Poland never once deviated 
from their pro-Albanian viewpoint* The Western bloc, in 
turn, although definitely pro-British, did attempt to be 
somewhat impartial. The amendments of both France and 
the United States to the British resolution exemplified 
the desire of the Western bloc to compromise.
The voting however, except for Syria, was definitely 
along the East-West lines. It is true that when the Polish 
amendment was voted on in the April 3 meeting, the United 
States and Brazil voted with Russia. However, the opposi­
tion of the other states was not against adjournment but 
against the Polish reasons for adjournment* For when the 
Russian delegate asked for postponement in order to restudy 
the British resolution, all the states unanimously approved. 
Thus the voting of Brazil and the United States cannot 
be taken as a true test of East and  ̂est lines.
The Security Council did not acccanplish its end.
The case was still not settled. Yet la emphasizing the
legal aapeate of the eeae, and the paeelng of the proposai 
to aend the Incident to the %orld Court, the Security 
Council did make progress*
The ^orld Court did an admirable job. It was con- 
fronted with more conflicting testimony than the Security 
Council, In spite of this, the Court evaluated the case 
and presented a judgment. As for the proceedings, the 
hearings were certainly impartial# The Preliminary Albanian 
Objection was settled before any attempt was made to Judge 
the issue. Both sides were given ample time to present 
their case. Because of the mase of conflicting testimony, 
the World Court did not attempt to judge the facts until 
they were first evaluated by an impartial board of experts# 
The fair attitude of the Court is particularly evident in 
the third phase of the case~~the question of compensation 
to the United Klngd<wn, In view of Albanian failure to 
present a counterdeclaration, an order was issued on July 29, 
19^9 extending the time limits for the briefs# Then also, 
the Court did not accept the British figure until experts 
had first audited the amount.
The Court«S voting was not on East and west lines#
Of all sixteen members only the Judges from Russia and 
Csechoelovakia voted consistently for one side# The 
unanimous judgment that the British government, on November 
12 and 13 had violated Albanian sovereignty la both a credit 
to Britain and to the Court as a Waole# The throwing out
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of the teatimoay of OoDsaander Kovaoitlch on the grounds 
**that ttot enough facts arc available"^ la also a compliment 
to the thoroughness of the International Court,
In comparing the success of the or Id Court and the 
failure of the Security Council, one fact must be taken 
into consideration. In the World Court no state baa the 
veto power as is the case with the permanent members in 
the Security Council, The World Court, moreover, was 
free to decide the issue on the basis of existing evidence, 
undisturbed by political consideration. Hence the World 
Court was able to pronounce a judgment*
The ability of the judges as a whole to separate 
themselves from their nationalistic Ideas and to judge 
the case by its merits is certainly a credit. The Judges of 
Yugoslavia, Poland, United States, France, and Britain, etc,, 
did not vote straight national tickets. Neither the 
minutes nor the judgments ever mentioned the nationality 
of the members. In the Security Council, however, the 
countries names are recorded in the voting, instead of the 
names of the individuals.
The time element cannot be overlooked in evaluating 
the success of the Wrld Court in the Corfu affair. The 
passing of the months into years allowed both sides to 
approach the issue from a more logical viewpoint, Britain*a 
sense of grievance was appeased by the Court *s favorable
^ International Court of Juatlee. "Reports of Judg- 
manta» #te«y p, it.
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Tbut an incident that was not worth the risk of 




British Information Service, letter of August 6, 1953, 
sentto Mr. Arthur A• "Seanstt•
Proved invaluable on events following the Court * g 
Judgment of December 15, 1949#
British Information Service, letter of September 24, 1953, 
a ent to Mr. Arthur A ♦ èeune11•
Confirmed the fact that Britain did not accept the 
Albanian "token payment,"
International Court of Justice, "Reports and Judgements, 
  teya'en;"SoiraSd; -̂-----
Contains complete judgments as well as the dissenting 
opinions of the various Judges, Special orders of 
the Court are also included.
International Court of Justice, The Corfu Channel Case,
 5"Tols:; L e y a e n , ~ o m n à ' r
Vol. 1, 19k8; Vol. 2, 19k9i Vol. 3, 19395 Vol. !)., 1950; 
Vol. 5, 1950; Vol. 6, 1950.
VoluaoB 1-5 contain the whole proceedings ea fell as 
the briefs of Albania and Britain, The Albanian 
declarations are written in French, However the 
minutes as well as British statements are in English, 
Volume 6 is a thorough and complete index, Proved 
expeeially useful in checking information,
United Nations, Securitv Councjll, Official Records, 2nd
year, ianuary-*April7 1%Y. United Hâtions Secretariat* 






Amery, Julian, Sons of the Eagle, «a Study In Guerilla 
Londonf Macmillan & Co* ïtd,, 19^* pp*
Extremely interesting* Good account of the war years 
as seen by a first-hand observer*
Chambers, Frank P*, Christina Phelps Harris, Charles C. 
Bayley, This Age of Conflict. New York: Karcourt.
Brace k Co., T^OlT ̂ IFppT*
Good emphasis on the importance of the East-^est 
Conflict*
Goodrich, Leland M* and Edvard Hambro, Charter of the 
United Nations, C(Momentary and pociments. ^ston: 
#©rï<SrPeac© ^^ounàa11 oïi, 1949• fib pp*
Expeeially useful for understanding of the articles 
of the United Nations Charter*
Kovacs, Frederic W, L*, The Untamed Balkans* New York: 
Modern Age Books, l^ljTr PP*
Very effective for general understanding of the Balkan 
people*
Langsam, Balter Gonsuelo, The #orld Since 19lif* Hew York: 
Macmillan Co,, 19^8* 9^9 PP#
General Background*
Hedllch, Marcellus D. A* von, Albania: Yesterday and Today* 
Dorchester Massachusetts, 19)6*
A general survey*
Robinson, Vandeluer, Albania's Road to Freedom* New York: 
W* '" * Norton & Co*, 19^?*^
Se ton#» Wat son, Hugh, The East European Revolution* London; 
Methuen & Co., 1%0* )96 PP*Very good account of the conflict within Albania during 
the war*
Swire, Joseph, King Eog's Albania* New York; Liverright, 
1937*A good and thorough account#
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United Hatlona, Yearbook of the United HatIona♦
3 Vol. New Ÿork: Columbia 'University Preas, 1950. 
1951, 1952#General Reference.
B. PERIODICALS
Bancroft, Harding and Stein, Brio, "The Corfu Channel Case 
Judgement on,the Preliminary Objection," Stanford Law 
Review, l;o^6~65k, June, I9I4.9.
dooi aumnary of the first phaae of the Corfu Channel 
Incident in the ^Orld Court.
Bendel, J#, "United Nations Hews ; Troubled Waters," New 
Republic, 116:3!*., March 19i*.7#
TscEewHat pro-Albanian confient on the British resolu­
tion to bring case before Security Council. Very 
interesting*
Bruly, D. L., "Nations at Law," Spectator, L22-5. April 18,1947.Interesting background of the International Court♦s 
limitations.
"Corfu Channel Case; The International Court of Justice 
Jlds for Expanded Jurisdiction," Yale Law Journal, 58:187-19̂ , December, 19l|8.
Somewhat technical but the comaent that the decision 
on the Preliminary Objection of Albania might lead 
to expanded Jurisdiction is interesting.
"Corfu Dispute Recommended for Court," United Nations 
Bulletin, 2;^l5-l6#, April 22, 19U7.
Dedljer, Vladimir, "Albania, Soviet Fawn," Foreign Affairs, 
30:103-11, October I9I1.I.
Interesting general background.
"First Phase of the Corfu Channel Case Concluded," United 
Nations Bulletin, ij.;334-35# April 15. 1948*
"First Verdict by aorld Court," Scholastic, 12, April 20,
1949#Good birdseye view of situation.
Hudson, Manley 0., "Corfu Channel Case: Significance of
First Ruling by Present Court," American Bar Association 
Journal, 34*467-70, June, 1948*Presents some Interesting observations of the Court’s 
proceedings as well as com’nentaries on the decisions.
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"Incident* In the Corfu Channel," United Nations bulletin. 
2%43~$, August 15, 1947, ----------------------
“Incident In the Corfu Channel," United Nations Bulletin. 2*178-8!*̂  January 26-March If,“15577 ”
“International Court hears First Case," United Nations 
Bulletin, lfî22lf, March $, 195&*#
"Judgement in Corfu Channel Case," United Nations Bulletin, 
0;%8îlj.3$-75:îf8. May 1, 1)59 - January 1, I950.*
XfOgareci, Anton, "Albania and her Neighbors," C on temporary 
Review, pp. 93*10lf, July-Dee ember 1956*
Interesting background material emphasizing Albania*s 
Ingratitude to Britain’s wartime aide.
“Report on Corfu Chanriel Incidents," United Nations Bulletin, 
2:279-82 & 323-8, 'March 25 - April“l",' Ï9li7TÎ^-----------
f“Security Council Negotiates Corfu Resolution," United 
Nations Bulletin, 2:366-8, April 8, 19^?.*
Skendl, Stavro, "Albania flthin the Slav Orbit: Advent to
power of the Comiaunist Party" Political Science Quarterly,
53:257-75, June, 1958.Interesting background emphasising Tito’s role.
Vucinlch, v> s., "Comtiiuniaai gains in Albania," Current 
History, 21:355*52, December, 1951*
Mentïons interesting trends of Com lunlstlc gains in 
Albania.
aright, Quincy, "The Corfu Channel Case," African Journal 
of International Law, 53:591-95, July,"1959#Good tut brie ? s um̂ ia r y of the incident in the or Id 
Court.
C. NH'ABPAPERS
Hew York Times, January 1956-August, 1953#Proved Invaluable for general background and "behind- 
the-scenes" reporting*
* All the United Nations Bulletin articles were very




ARTICLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED HATIONS
article XXVII;
1# Each member of the Security Council aiiall have one vote,
2. Deolalone of the Security Council on procedural 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote of seven members,
3« Decisions of the Security Council on all other 
matters shall be made by an affirmative vote 
of seven members including the concurring votes 
of the permanent membersj provided that, in 
decisions under Chapter VI, and under paragraph 
3 of Article 52, a party to a dispute shall 
abstain from voting.
ARTICLE XXXII!
Any Member of the United Rations which is not a 
member of the Security Council or any state which 
is not a Member of the United Rations, if it is a 
party to a dispute under consideration by the 
Security Council, shall be invited to participate, 
without vote, in the discussion relating to the 
dispute. The Security Council shall lay down such 
conditions as it deems just for the participation of 
a state which is not a member of the United Nations,
ARTICLE XXXIIIs
1, The parties to any dispute, the continuance of 
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of 
international peace and security, shall, first 
of all seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration. Judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means of their 
own choice,
JJ, The Security Council shall, when it deems
necessary, call upon the parties to settle their 
dispute by such means.
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1# Any Member of the Dnlted Mat lone may bring 
any dispute, or any situation of the nature 
referred to in Article 3k to the attention of 
the Security Council or of the General Assembly*
ARTIC&B XXXVIg
1# The Security Council may at any stage of a
dispute of the nature referred to in Article 33 
or of a situation of like nature, recommend 
appropriate procedures or methods of adjust# 
mentd
APPENDIX B
AETiCtSS OP THE CHARTER OP THE HA0ÜB CO»VBHTIOH
Number 8, X9Ô7
ARTICM III
The laying of eutometie eontaet mlnea off the 
coast and ports of the enemy with the sole object 
of intercepting cmuaerclal shipping is forbidden.
m i G M  VI
When anchored# automatic contact mines are employed# 
every possible precaution must be taken for the 
security of peaceful shipping.
#9 6*
APPENDIX C
ARTICLES OF THE CHARTER OF THE IHTERHATIONAL 
G OORT OP JUSTICE
ARTICLE XXVt
Th« Members of the Halted Hationa agree to agree 
to accept and carry out the declalons of the 
Security Council in accordance with the present Charter#
ARTICLE XXXIt
If the Court Includes upon the bench a Judge of 
the nationality of one of the parties, any other 
party may choose a person to set as Judge# Such 
person shall be chosen preferably from among those 
persons who have been nominated as candidates#.#
ARTICLE XLl
1. Cases are brought before the Court, as the
case may be, either by the notification of the 
special agreement or by a written application 
addressed to the Registrar. In either case 
the subject of the dispute and the parties 
shall be Indicated#
2# The Registrar shall forthwith communicate the 
application to all concerned#
3* He shall notify the Members of the United Rations 
through the Secretary General, and also any 
other states entitled to appear before the Court#
ARTICLE LIII:
1# Whenever one of the parties does not appear 
before the Court, or falls to defend its case, 
the other party may call upon the Court to 
decide in favour of Its claim#
2# The Court must, before doing so, satisfy Itself, 
not only that it has Jurisdiction In accordance 
with Articles 36 and 37# but also that the 
claim Is well founded in fact and law#
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